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1. INTRODUCTION 
hen analysts and policy-makers tried to understand what 
happened after the 2008-09 financial crisis, excessive leverage in 
banking and quasi-banking (largely the Wall Street investment 
banks and parts of the wholesale money market) was immediately 
identified as the main transmission chain in the storm (Di Noia & Micossi, 
2009; Rajan, 2010). Excessive leverage, in turn, was found to be made 
possible by the fact that some institutions that were behaving like banks 
were not subject to banking rules; and by a combination of lax rules on the 
definition of capital, off-balance commitments undertaken by banks thanks 
to new securitisation techniques, and massive resort to risk mitigation 
practices, including complacent ratings of complex securities and hedging 
instruments, notably credit default swaps (CDS), that reduced the 
absorption of regulatory capital to zero.  
The reaction of central bankers was to coalesce behind the capital 
requirements set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
and tighten the screws of prudential regulation. They failed, however, to 
call into question two fundamental features of the regulatory framework: i) 
capital is determined on the basis of risk-weighted assets whose value is 
largely calculated by the banks themselves, and ii) supervisory action must 
remain at the full discretion of national authorities. And these features 
persist, despite massive evidence of manipulation of risk-weighting by 
banks that failed or had to be bailed out and rampant forbearance by 
national supervisors when large national banking groups grew out of 
proportion and undertook unmanageable risks.  
An important permissive factor, in this context, was the opacity of 
regulatory capital ratios, which do not provide a reliable indicator of a 
bank’s weakness or strength, thereby muting market discipline and making 
it possible for supervisors to side with their regulated banks in delaying 
loss recognition.   
W
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None of these failings has been corrected. As a consequence, the 
banking system continues to represent a potential source of financial 
instability much in the same way as it did when the crisis struck. We argue, 
therefore, that the international framework for prudential regulation of 
banking must be profoundly modified so as to bring about a more stable 
banking system, effective and independent supervision, and strong 
disincentives against excessive risk-taking by bank management and 
shareholders.   
Banks are special because they provide liquidity services (insurance) 
to their depositors and monitoring services on the quality of loans to their 
investors. The maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities and 
the opacity surrounding the quality of their loans expose them to ‘runs’ on 
deposits which may arise even if the bank is solvent, due to exogenous 
shocks affecting confidence. In this context, forcing banks to hold capital 
has two main purposes: the protection of small savers (and eventually 
taxpayers, lest the government be forced to pay for banking losses) against 
bank insolvency, and systemic stability, since runs are contagious and 
banking crises can spread rapidly when confidence evaporates. 
1.1 Micro-prudential regulation 
Under the ‘representation hypothesis’ proposed by Dewatripont & Tirole 
(1994), micro-prudential regulation of individual banks copes with agency 
problems arising from the inability or unwillingness of depositors to 
properly monitor risk-taking by their banks, in a world of incomplete 
markets and asymmetric information on the quality of banking assets. 
Deposit insurance aggravates the problem since insured depositors lose 
interest in monitoring their banks’ performance, thus largely freeing 
management from market discipline. Management and shareholder 
incentives are further skewed in favour of excessive risk-taking by lending 
of last resort and the implicit promise of a bail-out normally attached to the 
banking charter, as well as by the limited liability provision of 
incorporation.  
The regulator’s fundamental role then is to monitor the bank’s 
performance in the best interest of depositors and to use a variety of tools 
to prevent bankers from engaging in excessive risk-taking. Since the 1980s, 
with deregulation, globalisation and the information-technology revolution 
eroding the scope and effectiveness of direct controls, a central role 
amongst these tools was taken up by bank capital. The main function of 
capital then is to reduce risk-taking by bankers and provide a buffer to 
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absorb losses and allow the orderly liquidation of assets (Allen & Gale, 
2007; Berger et al., 1995; Santos, 2000). Capital requirements became the 
cornerstone of efforts to harmonise banking rules across the main financial 
centres, under the auspices of a newly established Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (Tarullo, 2008).  
Basel I offered a pragmatic approach to raise capital requirements 
internationally and somewhat level a playing field that was becoming 
uneven, following the inroads made by Japanese banks into world capital 
markets: capital requirements were set at 8% of ‘risk-weighted’ assets. But 
the approach was rough. It was predicated on a traditional view of banking 
as the extension of credit funded from a stable deposit base. Hence, 
attention was concentrated on the asset side, ignoring the fact that banks 
worldwide had for quite some time been developing business models 
based on simultaneous asset and liability management, with an increasing 
part of their funding coming from the wholesale money market. This 
development made their funding more volatile and entailed new liquidity 
risks while massively increasing the inter-connections between banks, thus 
rendering the system more prone to aggregate liquidity shocks.  
Basel I also excluded from consideration market (interest rate and 
valuation) risks, which again is a curiosity since an increasing share of 
banks’ returns was coming from trading on own account. This obvious 
flaw was seemingly corrected by the 1996 revision of Basel I, but, as will be 
seen, capital absorption on this account remained negligible and later 
proved utterly insufficient to cover losses stemming from trading books. 
Moreover, the correction was based on banks’ internal risk calculations, an 
approach that was later generalised in the calculation of risk weights by the 
Basel II Accord. 
In Basel I, capital requirements were set on the basis of a small 
number of ‘risk buckets’, each entailing different capital absorption weights 
depending on the counterpart; government securities and interbank 
transactions carried respectively a zero and low weight (20%), while loans 
to individuals and companies carried a 100% weight. Under that system, a 
30-year fixed-rate government bond was thus declared less risky, despite 
its potentially large market risk, than a loan to a company with a stellar 
credit record. Furthermore, within each risk bucket, risks were 
undifferentiated, creating an incentive to choose riskier assets yielding 
higher returns. 
Banks became increasingly vocal in the 1990s and early 2000s in their 
criticism of the Basel I approach to risk weighting. Their real target, in an 
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environment of increasing competitive pressures in the deregulated global 
arena, was to reduce capital requirements; their main argument was that 
Basel I overstated ‘true’ risks and that regulators should accept banks’ 
internal risk management calculations as more competent and accurate 
measures of potential losses, and set capital requirements accordingly. 
Regulators in the Basel Committee obliged. After lengthy and cumbersome 
negotiations, they reached agreement on the new Basel II Accord, which 
gradually entered into effect from 2007 (Tarullo, 2008).  
As later became all too clear, the new regulatory model was based on 
deeply flawed reasoning, both in commission as well as omission. The drop 
in capital requirements that took place in the 2000s in the wake of the new 
regulatory philosophy bears a large responsibility for the depth and 
extension of the financial crisis in 2008-09. 
The sin of commission basically stemmed from unclear goal 
identification. The main concern of regulators should be early identification 
of weak institutions and the adoption of prompt corrective action or, 
should this fail, their resolution without significant systemic spill-over 
effects. Under the Basel approach to capital requirements, one obtains 
precisely the opposite result (Calomiris & Herring, 2011; Dewatripont et al., 
2010; Goodhart, 2012; Hellwig, 2010). Capital rules are utterly opaque and 
their outcome does not offer useful guidance to supervisors and markets in 
identifying weakened institutions, as will be shown. They engendered all 
sorts of perverse incentives for bank managers that swelled tail risks, e.g. 
by encouraging risk mitigation (capital savings) techniques that apparently 
reduced and spread out bank risks while in fact concentrating them with a 
few counterparties and increasing their systemic correlations (Alessandri & 
Haldane, 2009). The models used for estimating risk weights and capital 
requirements are not robust to shifting economic circumstances, since they 
are obtained from non-stationary time series and cannot provide reliable 
forecasts for changing market scenarios. And supervisors are called upon 
to validate banks’ risk management models, thus becoming potentially 
accountable for their failure. This intimate relationship with bankers, out of 
public sight, makes them vulnerable to undue pressure to relax capital 
requirements to favour their national champions or help them ‘gamble for 
resurrection’ when things turn for the worse.  
The sin of omission is the failure to understand the deep reasons 
behind banks’ behaviour. In their criticism of Basel I, bankers singled out 
its rough risk-weighting as the main culprit of their asset substitution and 
risk-seeking behaviour, pushing supervisors to get ever-more involved in 
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banks’ risk management. But the problem only got worse with Basel II, 
which made it possible for banks to manipulate risk weights and make 
extensive use of risk mitigation techniques to reduce prudential capital. In 
reality, their behaviour indicates moral hazard due to deposit insurance, 
lending of last resort and the implicit promise of a bail-out in case of 
failure.  
Indeed, it is a fairly well-established proposition, both analytically 
and empirically, that when bankers’ risk-return matrix is truncated by 
limited liability or a public guaranty against potential losses, they behave 
as ‘risk lovers’ (in the classical definition of Tobin, 1958. In such a context, 
the imposition of a flat capital requirement, forcing banks to limit leverage, 
may well lead to an increased probability of failure, as bankers adjust their 
portfolio to compensate for the loss of returns by selecting riskier assets.  
This risk-shifting incentive can be eliminated by ‘fairly priced’ 
deposit insurance, which induces banks to become indifferent vis-à-vis 
their capital structure. However, the asymmetry of information on the 
quality of a bank’s balance sheets may make the computation of fair 
premiums close-to-impossible; fair premiums may even be undesirable 
from a welfare viewpoint, since they would entail a substantial subsidy to 
weak banks by strong banks (see Santos, 2000; Freixas & Rochet, 1995). 
More importantly, the incentives to take up excessive risks may vary 
substantially with market conditions, as for instance when an unfolding 
asset-price bubble generates opportunities for extraordinary gains from 
trading, massively raising the shadow-cost of prudential rules. 
In practice, in order to maintain some market monitoring pressures 
on banks, the coverage of deposit insurance was normally limited to retail 
depositors or to a capped amount for each deposit. This practice, however, 
re-opened the way to the possibility of a run, e.g. by wholesale depositors, 
as indeed happened in 2007 with the British mortgage bank Northern Rock. 
In the United States, deposit insurance fees were adjusted by the 1991 
FDICIA (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act) so as to 
penalise riskier business models, identified as such on the basis of a 
combination of capital strength indicators and supervisory assessments of a 
bank’s overall risk profile, i.e. the CAMELS ratings.1 On the other hand, the 
                                                     
1 Based on six areas of supervisory review: Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, 
Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk, where the latter component was added in 
1997 (see Eisenbeis & Kaufman, 2010). 
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very purpose of deposit insurance was frustrated, in the aftermath of the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, by repeated instances in which governments 
guaranteed in full junior creditors. These decisions were probably justified 
under the circumstances, but they certainly exacerbated moral hazard.  
When solvency deteriorates, the conflict of interest between 
depositors, on one side, and management and shareholders, on the other, 
may aggravate: the latter will in all likelihood want to take larger risks and 
‘gamble for resurrection’, while depositors would be best served by less 
risk-taking, since their money is at least to an extent on the line to cover 
emerging losses. At this stage, efficient regulation requires an increase in 
interference with the bank’s management by the regulator, including a 
credible mechanism to transfer control of the bank when solvency falls 
below a minimum threshold. The paramount role of capital, in this context, 
should be to signal distress at an early stage and trigger supervisors’ 
intervention. It may also act as a buffer cushioning losses during the time 
required for corrective action to be taken. One cannot see why a bank’s 
internal risk management techniques should have any role to play in this 
process. 
For capital requirements to be able to perform this function, the 
definition of capital ratios must be simple, immediately visible and robust 
to changing economic circumstances. Rather than a single capital ratio, 
inevitably bound to be seen or applied as a minimum, there should be a 
multiplicity of thresholds, each carrying stricter constraints and sanctions 
on management and shareholders. Moreover, since considerable 
uncertainty surrounds the ‘true’ value of banks’ assets in case of liquidation 
under distress, there is a strong argument in favour of erring in excess in 
setting capital thresholds. This view is quite the opposite from the 
regulatory philosophy of recent years, which centred on the mantra of 
‘economising’ capital, based on a ‘precise’ internal model of risk 
measurement. These considerations point to the need for a substantial 
increase in capital requirements. We will discuss its implications for the 
cost and availability of credit, notably under distressed financial 
conditions. 
The events leading to the 2008-09 financial crisis and the eurozone 
debt crisis of 2010-11 show that a main concern in prudential regulation is 
how to bring about effective supervision, a key factor in correcting bankers’ 
perverse incentives. In this regard, Rochet (2008) has stressed that 
prudential policy may be subject to time consistency problems, due to 
potential conflicts between the goals of micro-discipline, which require that 
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a mismanaged bank be closed, and macro-liquidity assistance, which may 
lead regulators to keep banks afloat for systemic reasons that should go 
under. 
The quality and independence of supervisors are of paramount 
importance; in this regard, strong constraints on supervisors and their 
enhanced public accountability are necessary. Accordingly, prudential 
rules should include an obligation, or at least a strong presumption, that 
supervisors must intervene when certain relevant thresholds are surpassed 
– including, at the end of the road, a credible obligation to resolve the bank, 
where credibility basically rests on the ability to resolve the bank without 
major systemic repercussions (Carmassi et al., 2010). In this manner, 
supervisors would be fully accountable for their actions, and inactions, and 
bankers would be under notice that reckless gambling would meet full 
retribution. 
This approach, pioneered in the US with the 1991 FDICIA (Benston & 
Kaufman, 1998), with its requirement of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
by supervisors, was traditionally opposed by the Basel Committee, always 
an unyielding advocate of supervisory discretion. This stance was 
extensively abused by delaying corrective action and forbearing national 
champions. The Royal Bank of Scotland provides a prominent example 
where the FSA was forced by public reaction to rewrite its first complacent 
assessment of what went wrong and its own part in it (FSA, 2011).  
The introduction in Basel III of a common equity Tier 1 conservation 
range and anti-cyclical buffer may be seen as an opening in the desired 
direction (Goodhart, 2012, but this is far from guaranteed, within the 
fragmented regulatory landscape of the European Union, unless the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) is given power to prod reluctant 
national supervisors into action. Special resolution procedures are now in 
place, besides the United States, in Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, and also to an extent in France, Germany and Spain; at the time 
of writing, the European Commission has not yet published its proposal for 
a common framework at EU level.  
If capital ratios provide reliable guidance to banks’ health and are 
easy to read, then market discipline can play a supportive role in limiting 
excessive risk-taking by banks. In this context, the compulsory issuance of 
subordinated debt could provide a good instrument to discipline 
management. It would work directly, since the cost of new issues would 
rise with a bank’s risk profile; and indirectly, since the market price of 
subordinated debt in secondary markets would provide information on 
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market perceptions of the risk of failure (Rochet, 2008). We will discuss a 
scheme recently proposed by Calomiris & Herring (2011), entailing the 
obligation for banks to issue debt that is convertible into equity at a highly 
dilutive rate, which seems to us especially effective in creating incentives 
for management and shareholders to maintain strong equity.  
1.2 Systemic stability and macro-prudential regulation 
A completely different perspective emphasises systemic stability and 
restraint of systemic risk as the main goals of banking (financial) 
regulation. Systemic risk includes “all events capable of imperilling the 
stability of the banking and financial system” (Rochet, 2010, p. 92), 
including macro-economic shocks affecting all financial institutions 
simultaneously, and situations of contagion in which the failure of one 
bank can rapidly spread to other banks and endanger vital functions of the 
financial infrastructure, e.g. the provision of liquidity to households and 
enterprises and the payment system.  
Here, the need for (macro-)prudential regulation arises from the 
‘public good’ nature of systemic stability, which entails that each individual 
bank may free ride on the willingness of others to pay for financial stability, 
and more broadly on bank managers’ inability to fully appreciate the 
systemic implications of their risk-taking decisions. For one thing, the social 
cost of a bank’s default normally exceeds the private cost, even absent any 
specific commitment of taxpayers’ money. For another, one individual 
bank may not fully appreciate the implications of counterparty risk 
concentration resulting from their derivatives and other hedging contracts, 
as it dramatically emerged in the credit default swaps (CDS) market after 
the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (BCBS, 2009a; Hellwig, 2010). 
The recent crises have once again highlighted the two main sources of 
systemic instability in banking systems: excessive leverage and 
interconnectedness through the highly volatile wholesale money market. 
The big game was borrowing short and cheap in the wholesale money 
market, notably the repo market; making leveraged bets on own account in 
high return-high risk assets engineered by securitisation magicians; and 
hedging these bets with few counterparties that massively underpriced the 
risk of default and kept little reserves to meet potential losses. High 
leverage was used to boost returns on a thinner and thinner capital basis 
(Alessandri & Haldane, 2009). The interbank and wholesale money markets 
offered a cheap and flexible source of funds, but led to a massive increase 
in interconnectedness between financial institutions.  
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The fragility of the system depends critically on the structure of 
interbank relations: the more deeply banks are interconnected, the more 
they are likely to pull each other into the abyss when confidence evaporates 
(Allen & Gale, 1998; Goodhart et al., 2006). Systemic instability always 
involves the evaporation of liquidity, with the interbank and many 
securities markets seizing up as mutual confidence among the banks 
disappears and banks scramble to roll over their sight liabilities and sell 
assets in increasingly illiquid markets.  
Many authors have tended to read systemic instability as cyclical 
instability, to be cured by anti-cyclical brakes such as dynamic capital 
provisioning: the emphasis, in designing the remedies, has been on changes 
in leverage ratios, rather than their level (see Brunnermeier et al., 2009).  
Much was made, in this context, of the role of accounting criteria, 
notably mark-to-market, in enhancing cyclical instability. As pointed out by 
Haldane (2012), banks were eager to mark-to-market their assets in 
upswings, in order to swell the value of guarantees available for 
borrowing, but changed tack and sought a relaxation of mark-to-market 
rules during the downswing. Of course, in the latter case moving away 
from market valuations strengthens the banks’ balance sheets only on 
paper but cannot enhance the liquidity of assets in case of forced 
liquidation. The jury is still out searching for less unstable accounting rules; 
but it is also clear that regulators were all too willing to accommodate 
bankers and thus directly contributed to swelling leverage in upswings and 
delaying loss recognition in downswings. 
Regulatory responses to the crisis have varied. The Basel Committee, 
under impulse from the Financial Stability Board, has concentrated on 
strengthening prudential regulation, and notably capital and liquidity 
requirements for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs); in the 
United States, the Dodd-Frank legislation has forbidden banks to trade 
securities on own account (the ‘Volcker’ rule, which is now encountering 
serious difficulties of implementation); in the United Kingdom, following 
the Vickers Report (ICB, 2011), the decision was taken to ‘ring-fence’ 
domestic retail banking (while leaving ‘casino’ banking to continue for 
international operations); both measures specifically aim at combating 
excessive risk-taking and moral hazard. The European Union has been 
busy bashing credit rating agencies and private pools of capital (hedge 
funds and private equity funds), while its main member states have 
resisted stricter capital rules on behalf of their major banking groups. 
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The new Basel rules, as will be discussed, include strengthened 
liquidity and ‘net funding’ requirements that will restrain maturity 
transformation and hence go in the right direction, but will only enter into 
force later in the current decade. It is open to debate whether the 
multiplication of capital and liquidity constraints, without a clear rationale, 
will restore financial stability and provide an efficient solution.  
The new rules also entail higher capital requirements, which however 
will still be based on the flawed risk-weighted approach that so far failed so 
remarkably with Basel Accords. The ready indicator that this solution is 
weak is in the new minimum capital back-stop introduced in the system, 
which has been set at 3% of total assets (the European Commission, by the 
way, has removed it as a binding requirement in its CRD IV proposal). A 
3% capital ratio means that banks operating with a leverage of 33 could still 
be compliant with Basel prudential rules. It may be recalled, in this 
connection, that when the financial crisis struck, some large international 
banks were operating with a capital ratio over total assets below 2%. Thus, 
there will be an increase in the ‘absolute’ capital ratio, but not a very large 
one. Such a system remains open to a confidence crisis almost as much as 
before the crisis struck. 
The key point, largely overlooked in the Basel policy circles, is that 
financial instability is a direct consequence of the aggregate, risk-
unadjusted capital ratio of the banking system. This ratio determines the 
leveraging and deleveraging multiplier that in turn drives the expansion of 
credit in the upswing and its contraction when liquidity evaporates. The 
rapidity of implosion of a banking system struck by a confidence and 
liquidity crisis depends on its average leverage ratio; in this regard, 
reference to risk-weighted capital ratios is misleading.  
Therefore, the primary way to reduce systemic instability is to raise 
the aggregate capital ratio of the banking system – equity over total assets – 
way above current values. If we reason in terms of multiple thresholds, the 
unweighted regulatory capital ratio corresponding to a ‘well capitalised 
institution’ should probably be set at around 7-10%, and the minimum 
capital triggering supervisory takeover of the bank should be no lower than 
4-5%. Higher capital requirements may offer an efficient alternative, in 
order to scale down bloated banking, to structural separation or outright 
prohibitions of activities, which may arbitrarily cut or weaken the supply of 
banking services (for a discussion cf. ICB, 2011, and also Calomiris, 2009; 
Goldstein & Véron, 2011; Turner, 2010). 
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2. THE CHANGING BUSINESS OF BANKING 
s early as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods’ fixed exchange rate 
system, in the early 1970s, deregulation, globalisation and 
information technology unleashed a dramatic increase in financial 
intermediation and radical changes in the size and structure of banking in 
the United States and in Europe. Within little over a decade, a financial 
sector fragmented in functional and geographical terms was replaced by a 
globalised financial system dominated by large financial conglomerates 
active internationally in a multiplicity of financial sectors. Already in 2000, 
over 80% of the assets of the largest 500 banking organisations were 
controlled by financial conglomerates, and among the largest 50 banking 
organisations the proportion reached 94% (Huertas, 2006). Total assets of 
the top 25 banks worldwide rose from 30% in 1990 to 77% in 2009 of world 
GDP (Goldstein & Véron, 2011).  
In the United States since the late 1980s, the Federal Reserve used its 
authority to relax restrictions on bank underwriting activities and started to 
press for the elimination of branching and consolidation limits. In the 1990s 
these trends found their way into the rule-book with the removal of 
geographical limits to nationwide banking, following the 1994 Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act; while the 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (GLBA) repealed the 
1933 Glass-Steagall Act’s separation of commercial and investment banking 
and removed restrictions on conglomerations. In 1997 the Federal Reserve 
Board also eliminated many of the remaining conflict-of-interest firewalls 
limiting connections between bank and non-bank activities within bank-
holding companies. 
Deregulation was largely motivated by the desire to promote US 
banks in the face of the increasing competition, domestically from the 
growing securities industry and non-bank financial intermediaries (e.g. 
pension funds and mutual funds), and in the global arena from non-US 
A
12 | THE CHANGING BUSINESS OF BANKING 
financial firms that were not subject to similar regulatory constraints 
(Calomiris, 2000). The goal of ‘competitive deregulation’ was explicit: 
“Unless soon repealed, the archaic statutory barriers to efficiency could 
undermine the competitiveness of our financial institutions, their ability to 
innovate and to provide the best and broadest possible services to US 
consumers and, ultimately, the global dominance of American finance” 
(Greenspan, 1999).  
In Europe, the Second Banking Directive in 1989 – introducing the 
single banking license with consolidated home country control – 
generalised throughout the internal market the German-Swiss universal 
banking model, removing all restrictions for commercial banks to operate 
in non-bank financial business. During the 1990s, national authorities 
strived to support their national champions and encouraged their cross-
border expansion, with little concern for their financial solidity, leading to 
the emergence of a few pan-European mega-banking groups that were very 
large relative to the domestic economy. Continental universal banks also 
made an inroad into aggressive Anglo-Saxon finance by purchasing UK 
and US investment and brokerage houses through an intense M&A activity 
(Herring & Carmassi, 2008; Di Noia & Micossi, 2009).  
In the United States, total assets of the 10 largest commercial banks 
amounted to 16% of US GDP in 1988 and rose to 21% in 1997 and 56% in 
2007 (DeYoung, 2010). As of year-end 2010, five US SIFIs alone had 
cumulative total assets amounting to almost 60% of GDP. In the United 
Kingdom, total assets of the 10 largest banks amounted to 90% of GDP in 
1986, 130% in 1996 and 344% in 2006; in France, the same ratios were 105% 
in 1986, 152% in 1996 and 370% in 2006; and in Germany, 79% in 1986, 
114% in 1996 and 207% in 2006 (Goddard et al., 2010). 
Thus, as may be seen from Figure 1, the weight of banking over GDP 
has grown out of proportion, especially in Europe: in 2010, the size of the 
banking sector relative to GDP in the United States was just above 80%, but 
amounted to 274% for the eurozone, 304% for Germany, 320% for France, 
418% for the United Kingdom and 493% for Switzerland (mainly due to 
two banks).2 A large share of these assets, in some cases up to a half, was 
funded in the wholesale market.  
                                                     
2 Swiss banks’ total assets amounted to 664% of GDP at the onset of the crisis back 
in 2007, while in the same year the ratio was 894% for Ireland and 876% for Iceland 
(up from 121% in 2001, according to IMF, 2010). 
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Figure 1. Total assets of banks as a share of GDP, by country (year-end 2010)* 
 
* Swiss data include foreign banks’ subsidiaries in Switzerland. 
Sources: ECB, SNB, FDIC for total assets of banks; IMF WEO (September 2011) for 
GDP.  
Thus, the concentration and globalisation of banking have made the 
systemic risk stemming from banking overwhelmingly relative to the 
national ability to withstand potential losses: financial fragility, or the 
probability of crisis, has gone up significantly with the rising share of 
funding coming from highly volatile sources, the worsening quality of 
assets and declining capital ratios. On all of these accounts, Europe is more 
exposed than the United States. 
Consider first the changes in bank portfolio composition and the 
resulting shift in income sources. Figure 2 shows the changing composition 
of bank balance sheets between 1988 and 2007 in some large countries 
(OECD data). There was, as may be seen, a large increase in the share of 
securities over total assets and a corresponding fall in the share of loans to 
the economy. The shift is more marked for European banks, although 
aggregate data may underestimate the phenomenon for the United States 
due to the exclusion from the sample of non-bank financial intermediaries. 
It is also more pronounced for large cross-border banks. 
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Figure 2. From commercial loans to securities trading* 
 
* All banks for the United States, Switzerland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands; large commercial banks for the United Kingdom. 
Source: OECD Bank Profitability. 
For instance, over the two decades under observation, Bank of 
America shows a fall in the share of loans to customers from about 60% to 
about 40%, with the share of securities rising to around 30%. In 2010, BNP-
Paribas had in its balance sheet a 34% share of loans, 54% of securities; 
Deutsche Bank, respectively had 21% and 63%. Until the crisis struck, a 
large share of securities was held in the trading book. 
In Figure 3 we have plotted, for the same national banking systems, 
the aggregate ratio between (net) non-interest and interest income and the 
rate of return on equity (ROE). As may be seen, the share of non-interest 
income goes up almost everywhere, but more markedly in European 
countries: with peaks of 300% for France, 180% for Switzerland and 140% 
for the United Kingdom. German banks lag behind (with a peak of 50% in 
2000) and generally show lower profitability. While the different weights of 
large banks in national systems and the presence in the United States of a 
large non-banking sector may somewhat distort the comparison, the 
evidence is consistent with the view that emerging changes in banking 
structures started in Anglo-Saxon markets but later spread to European 
markets, where students became sometimes more aggressive than their 
teachers.  
ROE was highest in the United Kingdom, with peaks around 20% 
around the turn of the first decade, and the Netherlands (some 18% around 
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the mid-2000s); average returns hovered between 10% and 15%, with a 
large increase over the previous decades (for example, the average ROE for 
US banks was 5.8% in the 1980s, 11.3% in the 1990s and close to 12% in 
2000-07).  
Figure 3. Bank profitability increasingly driven by net non-interest income 
(1988-2009)* 
 
*All banks for the United States, Switzerland, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands; large commercial banks for the United Kingdom (data running up 
only to 2008). 
Source: OECD Bank Profitability. 
The increase in returns was accompanied by a large increase in their 
variability, more markedly in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (Figure 
3). In this regard, in a long-term perspective, the end of fixed-exchange 
rates seems to correspond to a ‘regime’ shift.  
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Figure 4, drawn from Alessandri & Haldane (2009), presents evidence 
on ROE and its variability for a sample of UK banks over the past nine 
decades, from the early 1920s to 2007. As may be seen, up to the early 
1970s, the ROE moved in a range between 3% and 10%, with a mean value 
of 7% and a standard deviation of 2; afterwards, the average ROE jumps to 
over 20% and the standard deviation to almost 7, with minimum values 
below 5% and maximum values above 30%. The picture for the 1990s and 
2000s is confirmed by aggregate OECD data for UK banks; the standard 
deviation is even higher, close to 8% (Figure 3), due to the inclusion in the 
sample of data for 2008, the first crisis year. The peaks in the ROE 
coincided, not surprisingly, with the two waves of rapidly accelerating 
asset price increases at the end of the 1990s and in the mid-2000s. 
Figure 4. Return on equity for UK banks 
 
μ = mean ROE; σ = ROE standard deviation. 
Source: Alessandri & Haldane (2009). 
As may be recalled, the breakdown of fixed exchange rates coincided 
with a general relaxation of monetary and financial discipline worldwide, 
and the UK moved earlier than other countries to free its capital market, 
which already in the 1970s had become host to the euro-dollar market, the 
ballooning, and largely lawless, market for syndicated dollar loans, 
operating in London as an off-shore centre. The euro-dollar market played 
a prominent role in the recycling of the oil imbalances, and in the process 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
35%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
30%
1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 20011946 197619661956 1986 1996 2006
TIME TO SET BANKING REGULATION RIGHT | 17 
provided reckless lending to oil-importing developing countries, leading 
later to a first wave of banking rescues and external adjustment 
programmes. Complacent lending by international banks continued in the 
ensuing decades, leading to waves of local and regional banking crises in 
the developing and emerging world in the 1980s and 1990s (Kindleberger & 
Aliber, 2005). It must be stressed that, during these bouts of instability, 
international banks were largely shielded from losses, which fell on the 
shoulders of the borrowing countries under the aegis of the IMF financial 
assistance programmes (and close guidance by the United States).  
Clearly, large international banks exploited the looser monetary and 
regulatory environment to take much greater risks in exchange for greater 
returns. There is ample evidence that these developments mainly reflected 
their securities trading, funded from cheap but highly volatile sources. 
Please see Figure 5. 
In the upper quadrant we have plotted, for a cross-section of 16 large 
international banking groups, the (risk-unweighted) leverage ratio 
(horizontal axis) against the share of funding coming from the wholesale 
money market, including trading liabilities and derivatives (vertical axis). 
As may be seen, there is a strong and significant positive correlation 
between the two variables, i.e. banks with a higher leverage also display a 
higher share of volatile funding. The banks in the sample seem to belong to 
two distinct clusters, one with lower leverage and share of volatile funding, 
and the other with higher values for both variables. A large share of 
financing was procured in the form of repos, very short operations backed 
by assets of doubtful liquidity: a prominent manifestation of shadow 
banking, since money market investors were performing a bank-like 
function by de facto transforming the maturity of bank loans.3 
In the lower quadrant, leverage is plotted against the share of 
securities in total assets: once more, a positive correlation between the two 
variables is observed, weaker than before but still significant. It also 
appears that banks undertaking riskier capital market bets coincide with 
those more exposed in the wholesale money market. 
 
                                                     
3 In the repo market, banks pledged their securities as collateral for short-term 
loans from money managers and other investors. The collateral was often 
represented by repackaged loans used as security, which allowed higher returns 
for lenders but also considerable risks of illiquidity, as it later became all too clear.  
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Figure 5. Leverage, securities trading and short-term funding by large banks (2007)* 
Raising short-term funding to leverage …  
 
... and betting on ever-rising prices in capital markets 
 
* Leverage defined as total assets on total equity. Short-term funds: deposits, loans and 
repos from banks, money market instruments, CDs and other deposits. Derivatives: out-of-
the-money trading and hedging derivatives, less the value of netting arrangements. Trading 
liabilities: short positions, repos, short-term notes and other financial liabilities classified as 
held for trading. Total securities: trading securities + derivatives + available for sale 
securities + held to maturity securities + at-equity investments + other securities. 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on Bankscope data. 
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And again, the banks seem to belong to two separate clusters, with 
some banks showing similar shares of securities in their portfolio 
corresponding to ‘low’ and ‘high’ leverage ratios. The two clusters display 
a remarkably stable composition across the two quadrants. Thus, the 
combined observation of the two quadrants reveals that banks that were 
more exposed to the securities market were also more leveraged and more 
reliant on volatile funding.  
Figure 6 shows the evolution of total assets (2000=100) of the largest 
US and EU banking groups in the Mediobanca sample (13 US and 31 EU 
groups in 2009), and their leverage: visibly, the expansion of activities was 
financed on a rising leverage. The leverage ratio of European banks always 
moved to a higher ‘plateau’, while deleveraging after the crisis began later. 
A sizable share of assets and liabilities of large cross-border banking 
groups is represented by derivatives, normally accounted for at their ‘fair 
value’, i.e. the potential gain or loss on the contract. For instance, 
derivatives represent 54% of Morgan Stanley’s total assets at end-2010, and 
between 40% and 50% for other major US bank holding companies (except 
in Citigroup, where the percentage ratio is 26). In Europe, the numbers are 
typically smaller, with the highest shares recorded by Credit Suisse (41%), 
Deutsche Bank (35%) and Barclays (28%), and all the others below 20% 
(Italian and Spanish banks below 10%). Similarly, large positions are held 
on the liability side.  
The problem is that under US GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles), banks’ derivative positions are reported on a net 
basis,4 while they are reported on a gross basis under the IFRS 
(International Financial Reporting Standards) accounting principles. Not 
surprisingly, leverage ratios are quite different, depending on the 
accounting treatment of derivatives: for instance, on a gross basis, the 
banking groups holding the largest derivatives positions see their leverage 
roughly double (Credit Suisse from 22 to 35, Morgan Stanley from 15 to 30, 
JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs respectively from 12 to 20 and from 
11 to 19). Even after this adjustment, only Morgan Stanley, among US 
banking groups, has reached leverage ratios close to those of large EU 
banking groups. Thus, it remains true that large EU banking groups are 
                                                     
4 Gross positive values are netted with gross negative fair values under a master 
netting agreement; cash collateral is also computed for netting. 
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more leveraged than their US counterparts. We return to this issue in 
Chapter 4, when we discuss the role of risk-weighting in swelling leverage. 
Figure 6. Banks’ total assets and leverage, EU and US (2000-09)* 
 
* Largest 31 EU and largest 13 US banking groups by total assets in 2009. Leverage 
= total assets net of intangible assets/net tangible equity. 
Source: Mediobanca (2011).  
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3. BANK CAPITAL IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
n the very long run – as may be seen from US time series, thanks to 
Kaufman (1992) and Herring (2011a) – bank capital shows a strong 
downward trend (Figure 7). Kaufman argued convincingly that the 
main force pushing it down even before the creation of deposit insurance 
and lending of last resort was the reduced risks of bankruptcy. Since the 
risk of insolvency would lead rapidly to withdrawal of liquidity and the 
suspension of activity, bankers were ready to raise capital fairly rapidly in 
response to losses, as confirmed by the rise in capital ratios after waves of 
insolvency. Therefore, they would push leverage only up to the point 
where the marginal increase in their funding risk premium, due to higher 
bankruptcy risk, would offset higher returns on equity from higher 
leverage. Kaufman also observed that, even before deposit insurance, 
capital in banking appeared systematically lower than in other industries 
(based on data dating back to 1902), and that this could be explained by 
depositors’ losses in bank failures being generally small, between 0.10 and 
0.20 on the dollar, which compared with losses of 0.90 on the dollar for 
bond-holders of failed non-financial firms. Thus, market discipline on 
individual institutions on the whole seemed to work, and capital 
requirements were determined by the risk of bankruptcy, fully reflected in 
the cost of funding. 
However, microeconomic discipline was apparently not sufficient to 
prevent recurrent banking crises and panics (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). 
Three main explanations for panics are present in the literature: the 
business cycle; liquidity shocks (demand or supply driven) leading to very 
large changes in asset prices, as when there is an asset price bubble; and 
random exogenous events (Allen & Gale, 2007). They all entail systemic 
interactions between financial intermediaries and markets, and multiple 
equilibria with sudden shifts from ‘good weather’ to ‘bad weather’.  
I
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Figure 7. The capital ratio of US banks (1834-2010) 
 
Source: Herring (2011a). 
The risk of these events is clearly underpriced by individual banks 
and financial intermediaries, which do not hold sufficient capital reserves 
against such occurrences, reflecting the divergence between the private and 
social costs of financial crises and the public good nature of financial 
stability. Widespread underpricing of the risk of systemic instability leads 
inevitably to excessive aggregate leverage, and hence to a higher 
deleveraging multiplier; when the asset price pendulum swings adversely, 
deleveraging magnifies the real economic costs of falling asset prices.  
The high economic cost of banking crises is the reason why sooner or 
later all countries instituted central banks – starting with Sweden and the 
United Kingdom in the late 17th century – and gradually developed 
banking charters, lending of last resort and deposit insurance. In the United 
States, the National Banking Act of 1863 created the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency entrusted with chartering and supervising 
national banks. The Federal Reserve was established in 1914, following the 
1907 panic, with some capacity to lend through the discount window; 
deposit insurance and full lending of last resort were set up in the 1930s as 
part of the banking legislation enacted after the Great Depression. 
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As may be seen from Figure 7, each of these developments led to a 
large decline in bank capital ratios: they went from 55% to 30-35% after the 
National Banking Act, and to a range between 5% and 10% after the 1930s 
legislation (Herring, 2011a). A specific incentive for banks to leverage arose 
with the creation of the federal corporate income tax, which allowed banks 
to deduct interest costs on their borrowing.5 While the specific contribution 
of each of these factors is not easy to disentangle, there seems to be little 
doubt that they accentuated the declining trend in capital ratios – until 
eventually banks came to hold too little capital to meet a sudden liquidity 
and confidence crisis (Herring, 2011a).  
During the ensuing four decades, the financial system was kept 
stable, in the United States and elsewhere in the developed world, by 
pervasive structural restrictions on banking activities, in a disciplined 
macro-financial environment prompted by fixed exchange rates. When 
these constraints were relaxed in the 1970s, banking crises started to appear 
again with increased frequency. If up until the early 20th century, too little 
government had been seen as the main source of instability, now the culprit 
was identified in faulty and internationally inconsistent macro-policies, as 
well as, poignantly, in moral hazard created by banking charters and the 
attendant promise to rescue bankers from their mistakes (Allen & Gale, 
2007).  
3.1 The first Basel Accord  
This is the context in which the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) negotiated the first Basel Capital Accord, adopted in July 1988. The 
Accord had two main goals: to reverse the global trend of weakening bank 
capital and foster competitive equality internationally (BCBS, 1988; 
Goodhart, 2011; Tarullo, 2008). A specific concern here was to respond to 
the ongoing international onslaught by Japanese banks, which operated on 
very thin capital.  
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision was established in 1974 by 
the central bank governors of the G-10, following the Herstatt Bank failure. 
The first output of the BCBS was the Basel Concordat of 1975 on 
                                                     
5 As noted by Herring (2011a), the federal corporate income tax was in fact 
introduced in 1909, but with very low rates; it was only after World War I that 
rates were raised significantly and started to represent a significant incentive to 
leveraging. 
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supervision of banks' foreign establishments (BCBS 1975). The Concordat 
was revised in 1983 to further clarify the international allocation of 
supervisory responsibilities: home country authorities were assigned 
oversight on the solvency of banking groups on a consolidated basis, while 
host countries retained responsibility for the solvency of subsidiaries of 
foreign banking groups established in their jurisdiction, and the liquidity of 
their branches (BCBS, 1983). This allocation of tasks still holds today.  
In the 1980s, the Basel Committee turned its attention to the level of 
capital. The first Basel capital framework, known as Basel I, introduced a 
minimum capital requirement of 8% of risk-weighted assets (RWA). These 
were to be calculated by applying pre-determined weights to exposures, 
based on the nature and geographical area of the counterparty. Four 
weighting areas were introduced: zero for cash, government securities of 
OECD countries; 20% for claims on banks incorporated in the OECD; 50% 
for mortgages; 100% for claims and equity stakes in private corporations.6 
There were also provisions for the inclusion of off-balance sheet items in 
the total assets: first, a conversion factor was used to obtain the balance 
sheet asset-equivalent of off-balance sheet items; and, second, each such 
‘asset’ was included in its risk bucket based on the counterparty. National 
regulators could apply more lenient weights to claims backed by real or 
personal guarantees – which opened the door to a broadened use by banks 
of risk-mitigation techniques to reduce the absorption of capital, under the 
benevolent eye of their regulators.  
In the Committee’s view, risk-weighting had the following 
advantages: it would provide a fairer basis for rules applying to banking 
systems whose structures may differ; it would allow off-balance-sheet 
exposures to be incorporated more easily into the measure; and it would 
not deter banks from holding liquid assets, such as government securities 
and interbank positions, which at the time were universally seen as low 
risk (BCBS, 1988). With the benefit of hindsight, risk weighting did not 
achieve the first two goals but, on the contrary, the system encouraged 
aggressive risk-mitigation techniques and regulatory arbitrage; the third 
goal was achieved, but biased bank portfolios in favour of government and 
banking counterparts, which later became a source of instability.  
                                                     
6 National regulators also had the option to apply weights of 0, 10, 20 or 50% to 
domestic public sector entities other than central governments. 
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The definition of regulatory capital included a wide range of eligible 
instruments: core (Tier 1) capital, i.e. equity and disclosed reserves; 
supplementary (Tier 2) capital, accepted up to 100% of Tier 1 capital and 
comprising other reserves and provisioning accounts, hybrid debt capital 
instruments and junior term-debt. Some items also had to be deducted 
from required capital, notably goodwill and investments in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries engaged in banking and financial activities and in the capital 
of other banks and financial institutions.7 Ample room for national 
discretion in the definition of capital was to become a source of significant 
cross-country inconsistencies, hampering the key objective of levelling the 
playing field.  
Initially designed for international banks of the G-10 area, the Basel I 
regime was eventually applied by over 100 countries. Its impact was 
significant, as it raised the overall regulatory solvency ratio of the main 
banks in the G-10 countries from 9.3% in 1988 to 11.2% in 1996 (BCBS, 
1999a; see Figure 8), thus halting the historical downward trend in capital 
ratios – albeit with the important exception of the United Kingdom. In the 
United States, solvency ratios went up also following the 1991 FDIC 
Improvement Act, which established a system of unweighted capital floors 
to be used as a trigger for supervisory intervention under the PCA system. 
In part owing to its very success, Basel I soon came under 
considerable criticism. The Basel framework was predicated on the 
traditional banking business model of raising deposits and lending to 
households and businesses, which explains why credit risk was accounted 
for, while interest rate and market risks were neglected. Moreover, risk 
buckets were roughly identified, giving rise to arbitrage opportunities 
across and within the buckets.8 Banks complained loudly about the rigidity 
                                                     
7 This deduction was accepted in order to avoid ‘double-gearing’; the decision on 
deductibility was left to national authorities. The Committee was “very conscious 
that such double-gearing (or double-leveraging) can have systemic dangers for the 
banking system by making it more vulnerable to the rapid transmission of 
problems from one institution to another”, but was not “in favour of a general 
policy of deducting all holdings of other banks’ capital, on the grounds that to do 
so could impede certain significant and desirable changes taking place in the 
structure of domestic banking systems” (BCBS, 1988, p. 7). 
8 For instance, the same 100% weight was applied to multinational companies and 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs); government securities of OECD countries 
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of the system, as well as about the fact that neither the benefits of 
diversification nor the implications of loan maturity were taken into 
account in the determination of capital absorption.  
 
Figure 8. The effects of the Basel Accords on bank capital* 
 
* Capital and reserves in the OECD definition. For the UK, large commercial banks 
and data up to 2008. 
Source: OECD Bank Profitability. 
As a partial response to these deficiencies, Basel I was amended in 
1996 to include an explicit capital requirement for market risk (BCBS, 
1996),9 calculated with reference to the risks of “interest rate-related 
instruments” (e.g. debt securities, interest rate derivatives) and equities in 
the trading book, and foreign exchange and commodities risk “throughout 
the bank” (i.e. in the banking and trading books). Capital requirements 
were to be calculated at least partly from banks’ internal Value-at-Risk 
                                                                                                                                       
were granted a 0% weight, regardless of the fact that some sovereigns were clearly 
more risky (and as a consequence offered higher returns) than others. 
9 The first Basel Committee proposal to extend capital regulation to market risk 
dates back to 1993 (BCBS, 1993). 
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(VaR) models, conditional on their validation by supervisors:10 a 
momentous precedent, later to be extended to credit and operational risk 
with the Basel II Accord. As it turned out, the new capital requirement did 
not add much to capital ratios and failed to create an adequate cushion 
against banks’ actual losses on their market risks. 
3.2 From Basel I to Basel II  
Already towards the end of the 1990s, regulators and the banks themselves 
became vocal critics of Basel I, principally on two grounds (Tarullo, 2008). 
First, the rapid increase in securitisation of mortgages and other loans 
offered to the more sophisticated banks effective instruments for reducing 
the absorption of capital, thus opening an increasing divergence between 
capital requirements and actual credit risks. Second, significant advances in 
the risk management techniques of large banks amplified the divergences 
between banks’ best estimates of credit risks and regulatory risk 
coefficients. Regulators were stung by the implicit accusation of 
incompetence in confronting the rapid pace of innovation and banks’ 
improved capacity to manage risk. Soon, the banks coalesced around the 
goal of placing their internal risk management models as the basis of a 
revised regulatory framework – under the so-called ‘internal ratings-based’ 
(IRB) approach – with strong support by the Federal Reserve.  
                                                     
10 The capital requirement for market risk was to be calculated as the sum of: i) a 
capital charge based on a standardised method (for banks not using internal 
models) covering general and specific interest rate risk and equity position risk, as 
well as foreign exchange and commodities risk; ii) a capital charge based on an 
internal models approach, being the higher of a) the previous day’s Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) number and b) an average of the daily VaR measures of each of the 
preceding 60 business days multiplied by a factor. Internal models were in 
principle allowed to measure general risk (related to aggregate market 
movements) and also specific risk (related to specific counterparties/issuers or 
instruments). However, with regard to specific risk, the modelling of some key 
variables such as event risk (sudden and relevant price change) or default risk 
(sudden failure of issuer) turned out to be too complex and burdensome in terms 
of additional conditions imposed (e.g. ability of the model to explain ex-ante 
changes in portfolios value, capture concentration and remain reliable in stress 
conditions). As a consequence, a fallback option was preferred, consisting of 
applying a risk surcharge, a multiplier of 4 (rather than 3) to the specific VaR 
measure. 
28 | BANK CAPITAL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
By June 2000, the BCBS agreed to a far-reaching shift to the IRB 
approach. From the start, the new system proved very complex: 
negotiations opened on the basis of a 450-plus-page consultation document 
and went on for almost six years. The new system was formally agreed 
upon in June 2006 and was phased in during 2007-08.11 Two aspects are 
worth stressing: unlike the previous exercise leading to Basel I, the 
prudential purposes of the new IRB approach were not clearly specified 
(Dewatripont et al., 2010; Goodhart, 2012; Hellwig, 2010). And despite a 
number of quantitative impact studies, the committee never came to a 
reliable assessment of its effects on required capital ratios (Tarullo, 2008). 
In practice, while formally maintaining the 8% required capital ratio 
over risk-weighted assets, the Basel II Accord introduced two main 
changes. It substituted the fixed-weight risk buckets of Basel I with a new 
system for fine-tuning risk-weight calculations on the basis of external 
ratings and internal models (Pillar 1); and it complemented capital ratios 
with principles for enhanced supervisory review (Pillar 2) and 
transparency to strengthen market discipline (Pillar 3).  
Already in the original text of the 1988 Accord, the BCBS had 
recognised certain weaknesses in the system, including the narrow focus on 
credit risk and the fact that “capital adequacy is one of a number of factors 
to be taken into account when assessing the strength of banks”, and 
“capital ratios, judged in isolation, may provide a misleading guide to 
relative strength”. Pillars 2 and 3 were the belated response to those 
concerns, expressing the aspiration to a broader approach in evaluating 
banks’ risk profile. 
As to the calculation of risk weights under Pillar 1, the system is 
ludicrously complex. There are separate formulas for credit risk, market 
risk and a new risk category, operational risk.  
Three possible methods can be used for credit risk: standardised, 
foundation internal rating based (FIRB) and advanced internal rating based 
(AIRB). Under the standardised approach, the weights are calculated based 
on the counterparty (i.e. banks, corporations, sovereigns), as under Basel I, 
and the (external) rating assigned to each counterparty by rating agencies. 
With IRB methods, the weights of individual exposures are calculated 
from a common mathematical formula – the asymptotic single risk factor 
                                                     
11 For a detailed analysis of the implementation of Basel II in the midst of 
turbulence, see Ayadi (2008). 
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(ASRF) model, developed by Gordy (2003)12 – where banks provide the key 
variables in the calculation: the probability of default (PD), the loss given 
default (LGD), the maturity (M), the exposure at default (EAD) and the 
correlation to the single macroeconomic factor. With FIRB, the bank 
estimates the PD and the other parameters are estimated by regulators; 
with AIRB, all parameters are estimated by the bank with internal models. 
Internal models are validated by supervisors. 
Operational risk is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic 
and reputational risk” (BCBS, 2006a). Here too, various methods may be 
used at the bank’s discretion in the calculation, entailing quite different 
results.13  
As noted above, the new Accord had two new Pillars dedicated to 
supervisory review and market discipline. Under Pillar 2, supervisors must 
have extensive powers to review the effectiveness of banks’ risk 
management systems and adequacy of capital ratios, and intervene 
promptly to prevent capital from falling below regulatory requirements.14 
                                                     
12 The model assumes normally distributed probabilities of default and a unique 
factor of macroeconomic risks, admittedly two heroic assumptions. 
13 Three methods may be used: i) the basic indicator approach, where the capital 
requirement equals the average of 15% of positive annual gross income over the 
previous three years; ii) the standardised approach, where gross income is divided 
into eight business lines and multiplied by a factor specific for each line to obtain 
capital charges for each business line, which then are added to determine the total 
capital requirement; and iii) the advanced measurement approach, where capital 
requirements are calculated by the bank’s internal operational risk measurement 
system based on quantitative and qualitative criteria.  
14 Pillar 2 comprised four principles of supervisory review: i) banks should have a 
process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile 
and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels; ii) supervisors should review 
and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well 
as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital 
ratios; supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not 
satisfied with the result of this process; iii) supervisors should expect banks to 
operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to 
require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum; and iv) supervisors should 
seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the 
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The official text stresses the importance of taking account of other 
components, along with capital, in ensuring a bank’s soundness, including 
a strong risk management system, a sufficient level of reserves and 
provisions and effective internal controls. Under Pillar 2, supervisors were 
also required to handle risks “not fully” taken into account under Pillar 1 
(e.g. credit concentration risk), factors “not included at all” within Pillar 1 
(e.g. interest rate risk in the banking book), and factors “external to the 
bank” (e.g. the business cycle), as well as compliance with minimum 
standards and disclosure requirements regarding internal models for credit 
risk and the advanced approach for operational risk. It is worth recalling 
that the Basel Committee recognised from the very beginning that cross-
country differences in supervisory practices would entail difficulties in the 
implementation of Pillar 2 (see BCBS, 1999b).  
Finally, Pillar 3 was introduced to promote transparency and enhance 
market discipline by providing the public with ample information on the 
bank’s risk profile. Data for disclosure comprise a set of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators, applying to consolidated banking groups, of risk 
management systems, credit, market and operational risk, securitisation 
and equity positions, interest rate risks. In addition, banking groups are 
also required to disclose detailed information on regulatory capital, 
including its amount and composition, the regulatory deductions, and the 
breakdown of capital covering credit, market and operational risk, with 
separate data for capital determined under the different methods (e.g. 
standardised or IRB approach for credit risk). Under Basel II, banks are 
required to publish their ‘Pillar 3 document’ every year. The BCBS (2006a) 
emphasised the importance of making this information public, especially 
for banks calculating capital requirements with internal methods.  
Altogether, the Basel II system strikes the observer as ludicrously 
complex, making capital calculations difficult to read and interpret. As 
noted by Haldane (2011), in order to arrive at the capital requirements, 
large banks using advanced internal methods typically identify some 
200,000 risk buckets and 200 million computations to perform. And yet, 
while this is supposed to reflect precisely banks’ own risk assessment 
methods, in reality the result is arrived at on the basis of a uniform formula 
chosen by regulators, thereby necessarily deviating somewhat from 
                                                                                                                                       
minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular bank 
and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored.  
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individual banks’ own risk assessment (Rochet, 2010). The problem is 
compounded by powers given to supervisors to ‘correct’ the outcome of 
bank models and impose different capital requirements. The latter is 
explicitly motivated by recognition of “the substantial impact that errors in 
the methodology or assumptions of formal analyses can have on resulting 
capital requirements” (BCBS, 2006a, Pillar 2, Internal Control Review).  
Not surprisingly, a main criticism levelled at the system concerned its 
opacity, regarding both the adequacy of capital ratios, in relation to a 
bank’s risk profile, and the room left to national supervisors, out of public 
sight, to stand by their regulated entities when their capital weakens, thus 
delaying the day of reckoning but raising its eventual costs. Opacity also 
inevitably belittles the role of market discipline under Pillar 3, since 
regulatory capital ratios do not provide a reliable indicator of banks’ 
strength, as will be shown. In general, one is struck by the apparent lower 
relevance assigned by the Accord text to Pillars 2 and 3, which occupy 
altogether about one tenth of the full text of the Accord. 
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4. FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN BASEL 
CAPITAL RULES 
Prudential capital rules should possess three features (Haldane, 2011): 
i) the measure of the adequacy of capital should be clearly defined and 
simple to read by markets and supervisors, in full public light; 
ii) it should be robust to sudden shifts of market sentiment from ‘good 
weather’ to ‘bad weather’ and systemic shocks; and 
iii) it should provide timely recognition of emerging bank weakness so 
as to open the way to early corrective action by supervisors.  
Unfortunately, as we will show, the Basel solvency ratios do not 
possess any one of these properties: they are not easy to read and fail to 
identify weak banks; not only do they move pro-cyclically with market 
sentiment, but they completely fail to take account of systemic risks; and 
they leave ample room for delayed loss recognition, partly as a result of the 
possibilities created by accounting principles to manipulate accounts, 
partly due to the perverse incentives created by the system for national 
supervisors to connive with ‘their’ weak banks and ‘gamble for 
resurrection’ by their side.  
Already in their April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF 
(2009) published evidence showing that risk-weighted capital ratios 
seemed unable to distinguish in the financial crisis of 2008-09 between 
banks that failed or were rescued with public money and banks that could 
stand on their own. Haldane (2011) goes one step further and shows that 
banks that failed or had to be rescued actually displayed higher and 
improving solvency ratios in the months preceding their collapse. In Figure 
9, covering the period May 2002-December 2008, the single (red) line 
aggregates Tier 1 solvency ratios for banks that failed or had to be rescued, 
and the double (blue) line aggregates the Tier 1 ratios of those banks that 
survived on their own in the post-Lehman turmoil (see the note below the 
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figure for a complete list of the banks included in the sample). The 
horizontal bold-dotted line corresponds to the total 8% solvency 
requirement and the vertical dotted line corresponds to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, 15 September 2008.  
Figure 9. Basel solvency ratios cannot detect the ‘crisis’ banks 
 
Note: ‘Crisis’ banks are defined as major financial institutions which in autumn 
2008 either failed, required government capital or were taken over in 
distressed circumstances. They include: Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & 
Bingley, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Dexia, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
Goldman Sachs, HBOS, ING Group, Lloyds TSB, Merrill Lynch, RBS, 
Wachovia and Washington Mutual. ‘No crisis’ banks include: ANZ Banking 
Group, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banco Popular, Banco Sabadell, Barclays, 
BBVA, BNP Paribas, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Crédit Agricole, 
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, National Australia Bank, Royal 
Bank of Canada, Santander, Société Générale, Unicredit and Wells Fargo. 
Source: Haldane (2011). 
This evidence is indeed striking. First, as may be seen, both groups of 
banks most of the time had Tier 1 capital ratios around 8% – a level double 
the minimum required by Basel rules (4%), indicating a very comfortable 
solvency position based on regulatory criteria. Second, the Tier 1 ratios of 
the two groups are broadly indistinguishable up until 2006. Subsequently, 
solvency ratios distinctly improve for ‘crisis’ banks, but fall below 8% for 
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‘no crisis’ banks. In 2008, the ratio of crisis banks shows an increase in steps 
up to around 9%. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Tier 1 ratios do 
not provide a good indicator either of absolute capital strength or of banks’ 
relative positions. The observed increase in ‘crisis’ banks’ solvency ratios 
reflects new share issues but also accounting gimmicks. This brings to light 
the fact that some of them were manipulating their measured risks, before 
and after their capital increases, to show a stronger capital position than 
they had in reality.  
Further evidence on the reliability of banks’ rating models is 
provided by simulations run by the FSA, the UK financial regulatory 
authority, to evaluate banks’ estimates of the probability of default of 
wholesale assets for a sample of 13 UK banks (FSA, 2010). Once again, the 
results are striking: the application of internal models to identical 
wholesale credit portfolios produced capital requirements differing by a 
factor of over 100% for exposures to banks, 150% for corporate exposures 
and 280% for sovereign exposures.  
Moreover, Haldane (2011) reports that, based on end-2007 capital 
data for the four largest British banks, internal models largely 
underestimated losses from trading books in the ensuing three semesters 
(up to June 2009), which were up to six times larger than estimated with 
internal models based on the pre-crisis experience. Capital ratios higher by 
up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets would have been needed to correct for 
this model error for market risk. 
More broadly, in the upswing up to 2007, banks moved assets to the 
trading book and made aggressive use of mark-to-market accounting to 
maximise their leveraging room, thus amplifying cyclical instability; and in 
the downswing put enormous pressure on regulators and standard setters, 
especially in Europe, to let them move assets back to the held-to-maturity 
category, which is valued at historical cost (Haldane, 2012; Herring, 2011b). 
Huge losses were thus buried in balance sheets and were obscured by 
opaque provisioning practices – an important factor in the ensuing 
uncertainty and mistrust on the actual capital position of banks, which has 
played a prominent role in the confidence crisis in the eurozone since 2010. 
In sum, there is strong evidence that banks’ solvency ratios do not 
provide reliable guidance in identifying undercapitalised banks, nor do 
they permit supervisors and the market to exercise their disciplinary action. 
We will argue that this result is not surprising, and indeed reveals 
fundamental flaws in the Basel prudential machinery, by examining four 
features of the system: the definition of capital, the calculation of risk-
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weighted assets, ill-specified supervisory goals and the inability of the 
system to handle systemic risks.  
4.1 Regulatory capital 
The definition of capital was the most contentious issue in the negotiations 
leading to Basel I, but was left broadly unchanged with Basel II. The 
problem was how to accommodate national accounting and supervisory 
differences while coming to similar substantive results.15 The solution was 
the tiered approach to the measurement of capital. While Tier 1 capital 
comprised universally recognised elements, i.e. common equity and 
disclosed reserves, Tier 2 capital included a variety of instruments with 
lower loss-absorbency to reflect and accommodate national differences, i.e. 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions and loan-loss 
reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated term debt. 
Similar problems emerged with regulatory deductions from required 
capital, on which national authorities were given broad discretion, 
including for instance double counting of capital of banks’ insurance 
subsidiaries and deferred tax assets (Tarullo, 2008). 
The Basel negotiations became an arena where national supervisors 
were trying to obtain the best deal for their own banking systems. It is 
interesting to remember that only German supervisors took the position 
that only paid-in shareholder funds and retained profits should be allowed 
to count as regulatory capital (BCBS, 1988). The final compromise reflected 
all such negotiations, accepting Tier 2 elements up to a maximum of 100% 
of Tier 1 capital; subordinated debt up to a maximum of 50% of Tier 1 
elements; loan-loss reserves up to a maximum of 1.25% of risk assets; asset-
revaluation reserves taking the form of latent gains on unrealised securities 
up to 45%. Each of these allowances accommodated specific requests by 
one or another country.  
                                                     
15 For example, the meaning of loan loss reserves/provisions was different across 
Basel countries: French banks pushed to count as regulatory capital ‘country risk’ 
provisions (made for loans to a particular country even without the identification 
of loan-specific risks); Japan claimed that unrealised capital gains on bank assets 
should be counted as capital, and the United States advocated the inclusion of 
certain types of preferred stocks in regulatory capital.  
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The financial crisis highlighted the role of hybrid instruments in 
sweetening banks’ capital positions beyond prudence and their weak loss-
absorbing capacity when they were needed. 
The problem is compounded by accounting differences since 
measures of equity rely on accounting principles that vary from country to 
country and combine book values, fair values and market values. Banks’ 
agility in regulatory and accounting arbitrage makes it difficult for 
supervisors to keep up, as highlighted by the use and abuse of the so-called 
‘Repo 105’ and ‘Repo 108’, which were used by Lehman Brothers in the 
run-up to bankruptcy to reduce reported leverage (Valukas, 2010).  
More in general, the crisis has highlighted that accounting measures 
of capital are subject not only to manipulation but also to lengthy lags in 
loss recognition (Calomiris & Herring, 2011; Goodhart, 2012). The crisis has 
also shown that these lags are not only a technical problem but also reflect 
supervisory forbearance. For one thing, large losses were caused by off-
balance sheet vehicles that were not consolidated in the sponsoring 
institution’s balance sheet, but were de jure or de facto guaranteed by the 
sponsor. Moreover, when large losses start to emerge in a major financial 
institution, supervisors are slow to recognise them and, once they become 
aware of them, they prefer to ‘play for time’ and collaborate in hiding the 
information from the public. The data in Figure 9 showing a strong and 
improving capital position of banks that soon afterwards had to be bailed 
out must at least to an extent reflect this loss recognition problem.  
4.2 Risk-weighted assets 
Table 1 reports data for year-end 2010 drawn from the annual reports and 
Pillar 3 documents of 16 large banking groups. The first column shows the 
ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWA) on total assets; the second, the total 
Basel solvency ratio; the third, the ‘true’ leverage, that is, the ratio between 
total assets and Basel regulatory capital. Banks are listed in decreasing 
order on the basis of their leverage ratios. A note on methodology is 
required here: US banks and Credit Suisse report their derivative positions 
in balance sheets on a net basis, following US GAAP, while EU banks 
report them on a gross basis under IFRS. For the sake of comparability, we 
have converted the derivatives data for US banks and Credit Suisse to a 
gross basis; hence data for these banks do not reflect published accounts. 
As may be seen, regulatory solvency ratios show in all cases very 
comfortable positions, ranging from 12 to 22% of RWA, with a mean of 16% 
and a standard deviation of 3%. However, RWA represent widely varying 
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proportions of total assets, from a minimum of 13% to a maximum of 57%. 
The lowest ratios are recorded by Swiss and German banks, while Spanish 
and Italian banks show the highest values.  
Table 1. RWA, Basel capital ratios and leverage of selected banking groups, 2010* 
  
RWA/total assets 
(%) 
Regulatory capital 
ratio (%) Leverage  
Deutsche Bank  18 14 39 
Credit Suisse 13 22 35 
UBS  15 20 32 
Morgan Stanley 20 17 30 
Société Générale 30 12 28 
BNP Paribas  30 15 23 
Barclays  27 17 22 
JPMorgan Chase  33 16 20 
Goldman Sachs  27 19 19 
Citigroup  39 17 16 
Bank of America  39 16 16 
Unicredit  49 13 16 
Santander 50 13 15 
Intesa Sanpaolo  50 13 15 
HSBC 45 15 15 
BBVA 57 14 13 
Average  34 16 22 
Standard deviation 13 3 8 
* Total assets of US banking groups and Credit Suisse include gross derivatives 
positions. Therefore, data for these banks do not reflect those published in their 
balance sheets, which under US GAAP report net positions in derivatives. The 
leverage ratio is defined as total assets/regulatory capital. The average and 
standard deviation are calculated on un-weighted data.   
Sources: Annual reports and Basel II Pillar 3 documents. 
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Such large variations reveal the enormous leeway in the evaluations 
of banks’ risk positions with internal models, which is difficult to attribute 
solely or mainly to the quality of risk management by the banks.16 They 
also reflect the fact that prudential rules are a source of significant 
differences in banks’ ‘true’ cost of capital: those with lower RWA ratios 
need less capital and therefore may price their services more aggressively.17 
It is no surprise, therefore, that Basel rules are becoming the source of 
increasingly acrimonious disputes between banks, with some of them 
arguing that the system unfairly favours their competitors. 18  
As a result of wide variations in RWA, leverage ratios depict quite a 
different situation than the comfortable picture emerging from regulatory 
solvency ratios: with values ranging from 13 to 40 and seven banks with 
ratios above 20 – or total capital amounting to well less than 5% of total 
assets. Some of the highest leverage ratios are recorded by banks displaying 
some of the highest solvency ratios. In general, the situation of some 
banking groups is only slightly better than that prevailing at the end of 
2007, before the crisis struck. 
More detailed information on the composition of RWA is provided in 
Table 2, where RWA at end 2010 have been decomposed into the three 
main categories contributing to their calculation, for six very large 
European banking groups. These data fully reflect application of the Basel 
II Accord (operational risks did not exist in Basel I, and market risks have 
since been further refined, as will be described).  
                                                     
16 Daniel Tarullo, member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, noted 
that “these large disparities cannot be easily explained away through differences in 
risk profiles” and that it is difficult to understand the reasons “precisely because of 
the opacity of bank balance sheets and their internal risk models” (Tarullo, 2011). 
17 Ayadi et al. (2011) find a relationship between RWA and banking business 
models, with retail banks having higher RWA as a percent of total assets than 
investment and wholesale banks. 
18 In December 2011, the stress tests run by the European Banking Authority 
specified that “banks using advanced measurement approaches for credit and 
operational risk (IRB and AMA) have been asked to apply the Basel I floors (80%). 
There are a variety of ways in which the floors have been applied nationally and 
banks have followed different approaches depending on the existing national 
guidance”. The variance of RWA ratios in fact dominated the results of the stress 
tests, leading the EBA to concentrate the requests for capital increases on banks 
from the periphery of the eurozone – something that is now being vigorously 
challenged by Italian banks (ABI, 2011). 
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As may be seen, credit risk still takes the largest share, above 80% for 
four of the six banks. The market risk component represents 10% or less of 
total risks: reflecting in some cases a low weight of securities ‘available for 
sale’, in others the filtering effect of internal model calculations. Finally, the 
weight of operational risks – the risk of losses resulting from “inadequate 
or failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events”, 
and thus a fairly heterogeneous category – ranges between 10% and 30%. 
This constitutes another important source of differences in RWA 
calculations, which may not be easy to read by outside observers. 
Table 2. Low RWA (and low capital set aside) for speculative bets, 2010 
 BNP Paribas 
Credit 
Suisse 
Deutsche 
Bank HSBC UBS Unicredit 
Risk weighted assets – Credit risk 84% 73% 82% 85% 60% 87% 
Risk weighted assets – Market risk 3% 9% 7% 4% 10% 2% 
Risk weighted assets – Operational 
and other risks 13% 18% 11% 11% 30% 11% 
Sources: Annual reports and Bankscope. 
In general, the range of variation of RWA ratios makes regulatory 
capital ratios rather meaningless indicators of capital strength.  
It is by now widely accepted that internal models have enabled large 
banking groups to economise capital, which ex-post may be recognised as 
the real goal behind Basel II. It may be noted, in this regard, that the 
Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) preceding the adoption of the Basel II 
rules had predicted the decline in capital requirements made possible by 
internal advanced models (BCBS, 2006b).19  
While in all likelihood the main reason for the large variance of 
estimated RWA is ample discretion left to regulated entities and collusion 
with their regulators, it is worth noting that the models used for estimating 
                                                     
19 For example, the BCBS document on QIS 5 recognised that in the move from 
Basel I to Basel II, large, diversified and internationally active banks of G-10 
countries would see their minimum required capital increase by 1.7% under the 
standardised approach, but decrease by 1.3% under the FIRB (foundation internal 
ratings-based) approach and by 7.1% under the AIRB (advanced internal ratings-
based) approach. The Committee concluded therefore that “capital requirements 
provide an incentive for banks on average to move to the more advanced 
approaches” (BCBS, 2006b, p. 2). 
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RWA also suffer from fundamental technical flaws that engender scorn by 
reputed analysts (for all these weaknesses, see Dewatripont et al., 2010) and 
yet continue to be ignored by regulators. 
First, these models are based on restrictive assumptions, notably a 
normal distribution of default risks, scarce or no correlations between 
assets classes, and stationarity of data series used for the estimation. 
Unfortunately, in the multiple equilibria environment typical of financial 
markets, these assumptions tend to break down when the system is hit by 
large shocks, and agents’ expectations converge in a new direction. This 
implies that the models perform poorly as predictive tools in general and at 
all events are not robust to regime shifts.  
Another flawed assumption of the Basel risk-weighting approach is 
portfolio invariance: the capital charge on a given exposure depends only 
on its own characteristics, and not on the characteristics of the portfolio in 
which it is held. In VaR models, in particular, the marginal contribution of 
a single exposure to portfolio VaR depends on the overall composition of 
the portfolio, but the contribution can be portfolio invariant if three 
conditions are met: i) the portfolio is asymptotically fine-grained (no 
exposure in a portfolio accounts for more than an infinitesimal share of 
total exposure), ii) a single risk factor is the only source of systemic risk and 
iii) the realisations of the systemic risk factor are monotonically related 
with the conditional expected losses associated with most risk exposures 
(see Gordy, 2003; Gordy & Heitfield, 2010; Rochet, 2010).  
Of these three conditions, the single risk factor assumption is the 
most critical since, as repeatedly confirmed by experience, credit losses 
relative to exposures to the same industry are more correlated among them 
than losses for exposures to different sectors. Hence, VaR models tend to 
underestimate risks when portfolios are highly concentrated by sector and, 
for this reason, may also provide an incentive to choose precisely those 
highly concentrated portfolios. 
This leads us to a third crucial pitfall of the Basel approach: its failure 
to recognise the endogeneity of tail risks. Alessandri & Haldane (2009) 
pointed out that in the run-up to the crisis of 2008-09, banks adopted ever 
more similar investment strategies, while deluding themselves that they 
were reaping the fruit of their special wisdom (α returns), and that in the 
process their trading position had become more strongly correlated (they 
were harvesting β returns). Other authors (e.g. Calomiris & Herring, 2011; 
Hellwig, 2010) have called attention to the specific role of prudential rules, 
and notably VaR models, in encouraging banks to shift risks to the tail of 
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the risk distribution – with risk mitigation techniques that concentrated 
risks with few counterparties – in order to reduce the absorption of capital. 
In doing this, banks behaved as if systemic risk was exogenous; however, 
as they all converged to the same investment and hedging strategies, they 
were increasing the risk and return correlation of their portfolios, thus 
endogenously swelling systemic risk.  
Last but not least, models have to cope with serious problems with 
data, because they are backward-looking, and data are often available for 
too short a period of time, which can lead to significant errors, e.g. when a 
long period of stability results in an underestimation of tail risks.  
4.3 Misguided goals and supervisory capture  
As pointed out by Goodhart (2012), Hellwig (2010) and Rochet (2010), a 
main problem with Basel prudential rules is that they have unclear goals.  
First, the role of capital is insufficiently specified, frustrating its 
effectiveness in preventing excessive risk-taking by individual banks. If 
capital is meant to reduce risk-taking incentives, by increasing the stake of 
shareholders (‘skin in the game’), then there should be little room for 
hybrid capital instruments with doubtful loss-absorbing capacity. Nor 
should there be an implicit guaranty of a bail-out. If capital is required to 
provide a buffer to absorb losses and gain time for corrective action, then 
capital should not be a regulatory minimum, since it must be possible to 
use it when losses materialise without breaking supervisory rules. And, 
finally, the lack of a system to ensure early corrective action when capital 
falls short of statutory thresholds makes prudential capital requirements 
unsuitable for protecting creditors in case of default, as was repeatedly 
demonstrated by losses largely exceeding capital set asides. The problem is 
aggravated by accounting gimmicks and delayed loss recognition, as has 
been described above. 
Furthermore, the opacity of the system facilitated collusion between 
banks and their supervisors, tilting the balance of interest against 
depositors and investors and facilitating the tendency of supervisors to 
stand by their national champions in international competition.  
One should never overlook the fact that banks are powerful players 
in the domestic political arena, all the more so in European countries where 
banks play a central role in financing the economy and the public sector. 
The enormous increase in their size relative to GDP during the past two 
decades has only compounded the problem. As already stated, the main 
task of supervisors, in the most widely accepted justification of prudential 
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rules, is to protect depositors and investors in the presence of strong 
asymmetries of information as to the quality of banks’ assets and their 
overall risk position. Effective performance of this task requires strong and 
independent supervisors, and adequate scrutiny of their behaviour in full 
public light. These conditions are not easy to bring about since the subject 
matter is very complex, and supervisors are not only appointed by the 
government, but also often subject to their instructions. When a bank comes 
under pressure, it is natural for it to seek political support and place undue 
political pressure on supervisors to hide its difficulties and postpone 
corrective action. 
In this context, capital rules can play a useful role in fostering public 
scrutiny of banks’ actual strength and keep supervisors accountable to their 
true ‘principals’, i.e. depositors and investors. The opacity of Basel rules, 
with their unwieldy complexity, has achieved precisely the opposite effect: 
supervisors are left to the mercy of bankers and politicians out of public 
sight. At the same time, Basel rules require supervisors to validate banks’ 
internal models and give them ample discretion to correct model results. 
By becoming closely involved with bankers’ risk management, 
supervisors have lost their way and their soul. They have lost their way 
since their task should rather be to identify weak banks and concentrate 
their scarce supervisory resources to sort out their problems. They have lost 
their soul because, once they validate internal models, they inevitably 
become co-responsible for their errors, and may therefore be more 
prepared to collaborate with management in delaying loss recognition and 
gambling for resurrection. This is a most fertile feeding ground for 
supervisory forbearance. 
Opacity also facilitates collusion by supervisors with their regulated 
banks to pursue their national competitive advantage by tilting capital 
rules in their favour, thus distorting market structures and the allocation of 
resources. As Tarullo (2008, p. 213) lucidly observed, “the extent of national 
discretion and the opaque quality of the IRB calculations breed countless 
opportunities for the exercise of regulatory discretion in pursuit of national 
competitive advantage”.  
4.4 Systemic risk 
The Basel framework proved incapable of anticipating and containing 
systemic risk: the systemic and macro-financial stability dimension was 
neglected not just in capital rules but in the overall approach to financial 
regulation.  
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Systemic risk in financial systems basically arises from widespread 
excessive leverage by banks and their interconnectedness – and more in 
general, interconnectedness in the financial system – through the wholesale 
money market and derivatives markets. Rather than a run on an individual 
bank, a systemic shock entails a run on the banking system, as mutual 
confidence between banks evaporates, the interbank market dries up and 
banks are forced to deleverage and sell assets in increasingly illiquid 
markets. When this happens, the distinction between liquidity and 
solvency vanishes fairly quickly, as liabilities in banks’ balance sheets 
cannot be rolled over and asset prices dip precipitously. The abundant 
provision of liquidity through lending of last resort facilities may mitigate 
the problem when (most) financial institutions would be solvent in normal 
circumstances, but it may aggravate moral hazard by encouraging 
excessive risk-taking. 
The specific point of interest here is the role that microeconomic 
incentives and constraints created by prudential rules can play in reducing 
the risk of macro-financial instability. The problem arises, as anticipated in 
Chapter 1, from the nature of financial stability as a public good. This 
situation may entail that some banks free ride on the willingness of other 
banks to pay for stability, and more broadly that each individual bank may 
not be able to fully appreciate the systemic implications of its funding and 
investment strategies. In the run-up to the subprime crisis, for example, the 
correlation of credit risks from mortgages and mortgage-backed securities 
was largely overlooked by financial institutions, despite being closely 
connected to underlying macroeconomic factors that had been observed in 
many previous crises (e.g. a real estate boom and bust cycle). The 
concentration of counterparty credit risk in CDS markets was equally 
underestimated.  
In this regard, the Basel modelling approach overlooks the fact that 
risk is not an invariant property of assets but depends on banks’ business 
models and the interaction between banks when they come under stress as 
a result of a macro-shock. In other words, risk does not arise exogenously, 
but rather, is endogenously determined by the joint behaviour of market 
agents, implying that low-risk or risk-free assets simply do not exist. At the 
same time, as already indicated, models may have contributed to the build-
up of systemic risk by giving banks incentives to engage in derivatives 
activities in order to shift and conceal risks, in the process also increasing 
interconnectedness. And the low weight assigned to market risk by capital 
requirement formulas encouraged banks to move assets from the banking 
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book to the trading book, in this way making banks excessively exposed to 
fluctuations in asset prices. 
However, this is only one aspect in the failure to recognise systemic 
risk. Another, and more important aspect concerns the direct role of capital 
in braking or fuelling systemic instability. As was mentioned, many 
analysts and policy-makers have read systemic instability as cyclical 
instability, since large cyclical swings in banks’ balance sheets and asset 
prices are the typical manifestation of systemic shocks (see Brunnermeier et 
al., 2009), and have accordingly advocated anti-cyclical brakes in prudential 
rules. This approach is reflected in the new capital rules under the Basel III 
revision, which include a countercyclical capital buffer, to be decided at 
national level, that would be activated when credit accelerates sharply 
(BCBS, 2011a; European Commission, 2011a).  
This interpretation, however, overlooks the fact that the dynamics of 
financial instability at aggregate level is a direct function of i) the amount of 
capital available to absorb incipient losses; and ii) its ratio to total assets – 
the arithmetic inverse of aggregate leverage – that determines the speed of 
deleveraging for the banking system as a whole, through the credit 
multiplier, when banks are forced to replete their capital by emerging 
losses. Forced deleveraging could of course be avoided by individual banks 
by raising new equity from capital markets, but this is often too expensive 
or outright impossible when the banking system as a whole is struck by a 
confidence crisis. 
Capital here is important in three ways. A strong overall capital 
position will make a run on the banking system less likely by laying a more 
solid foundation for confidence. It will provide a large cushion to absorb 
incipient losses, thus gaining time and reducing the need to liquidate assets 
at fire-sale prices. And, finally, it will limit the amount of assets to be sold 
when deleveraging takes place, thus reducing the downfall in asset prices 
and bank losses. 
The Basel approach to capital regulation was structurally flawed not 
only for its misguided approach to risk assessment and the resulting 
perverse incentives, but also because in practice it made it possible for the 
banking system to operate on a very small aggregate capital cushion and a 
very high leverage. It was like charging a catapult for a much stronger shot 
when the crisis struck.  
To repeat: when the system switches from ‘good weather’ to ‘bad 
weather’, the main systemic risk for an individual bank is illiquidity, with 
(wholesale) funding drying up and prices of securities plunging due to 
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asset fire sales. In short, the banking system as a whole tries to retrench and 
deleverage. When this happens, the aggregate capital ratio determines the 
leveraging and deleveraging multiplier – which is the principal systemic 
dimension of capital requirements. 
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5. FAILED REPAIRS WITH BASEL III 
n the aftermath of the financial crisis, financial regulation was deeply 
modified on both sides of the Atlantic by a flood of legislation – on the 
whole responding to the main goals set in 2008 by the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF 2008) – addressing financial intermediaries, market structures 
and infrastructures, regulatory and supervisory architectures, credit rating 
agencies and, last but not least, prudential rules for banking. In December 
2010, the Basel Committee adopted the new prudential framework for 
banking, the so-called Basel III framework.20 The so-called CRD IV package 
transposing Basel III into EU law is currently under discussion in the 
European Parliament and Council. 
Basel IIII contains some significant improvements in prudential rules. 
The minimum level of high-quality capital, i.e. common shares and 
retained earnings – named Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) – has been raised 
from 2 to 4.5% of risk-weighted assets.21 Minimum Tier 1 capital, that is all 
capital to absorb losses on a going-concern basis, comprising CET1 and 
other Tier 1 instruments,22 has been raised from 4% to 6%. There is a 
                                                     
20 See BCBS, 2010a; BCBS, 2010b. The final version on capital rules was published 
in June 2011 (BCBS, 2011a). Masera (2011) provides a detailed review of the Basel 
III framework. 
21 Detailed criteria for eligibility as common shares in regulatory capital are 
specified, including the requirement that instruments must be the most 
subordinated claim in the liquidation of the bank and have a perpetual principal 
that can never be repaid outside of liquidation. 
22 The Basel III document sets out a number of criteria that capital instruments 
must meet in order to be counted as Additional Tier 1 capital. These criteria 
include the requirement that such instruments are: issued and paid-in, 
subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt; neither 
secured nor covered by a guarantee that legally or economically enhances the 
 
I
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commitment to harmonise Tier 2 capital instruments, designed to absorb 
losses on a gone-concern basis (but ensuing negotiations have raised 
doubts on the willingness of Committee members to renounce national 
leeway). Innovative capital instruments, previously accepted up to 15% of 
Tier 1 capital, and Tier 3 subordinated capital instruments, under Basel II 
assigned to cover market risk, will be phased out.  
Overall, total regulatory capital, i.e. the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital, must stay at least at 8% of RWA (Table 3). Therefore, the minimum 
overall requirement is unchanged, relative to present arrangements, but the 
share of Tier 1 capital has been raised from one-half to three-quarters of the 
total. 
Table 3. Basel III new minimum capital requirements (as % of RWA) 
  
Common equity 
Tier 1 capital 
Tier 1 
capital 
Total 
capital 
Minimum 4.5% 6% 8% 
Conservation buffer 2.5%     
Minimum plus conservation buffer 7% 8.5% 10.5% 
Countercyclical buffer range 0-2.5%     
Source: BCBS (2011a). 
In addition, two capital buffers have been added on top of the CET1 
minimum: i) a micro-prudential 2.5% ‘capital conservation buffer’, 
designed to cushion capital in phases of stress, thus raising the minimum 
CET1 to 7%; when this buffer falls below its statutory minimum, 
supervisors are expected to impose dividend restrictions; and ii) a macro-
prudential countercyclical buffer, to be applied by national authorities in a 
0-2.5% range to smooth cyclical swings, whose precise measure will be 
based on indicators of aggregate credit supply such as the bank 
                                                                                                                                       
seniority of the claim vis-à-vis bank creditors; perpetual (no maturity date and no 
step-ups or other incentives to redeem); callable by the issuer only after a 
minimum of five years, with prior supervisory approval and on the condition of 
replacing the called instrument with capital of the same or better quality; re-
payable only with prior supervisory approval; with full discretion of the issuer in 
the cancellation of dividends/coupon, without any features that hinder 
recapitalisation (e.g. an obligation for the issuer to compensate investors if a new 
instrument is issued at a lower price during a specified time frame). 
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credit/GDP ratio. Thus, total required capital will rise to 10.5% of RWA, 
when the 2.5% conservation buffer is fully respected, and may rise further 
when the countercyclical buffer is imposed by national authorities. 
Moreover, a further CET1 capital requirement will be imposed on 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), ranging from 1 to 2.5% 
of RWA depending on systemic relevance, measured on a number of 
parameters (size, interconnectedness, lack of readily available substitutes, 
global activity and complexity; BCBS, 2011b). The US Dodd-Frank Act has 
defined SIFIs as banking groups with at least $50 billion in consolidated 
assets and has given the power to identify non-bank SIFIs to the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). A decision has yet to be taken in the 
European Union. The Basel Committee has also introduced a contingent 
capital requirement under Basel III, requiring that non-common Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital instruments issued by internationally active banks contain 
mechanisms for ‘write-off’ or conversion into common equity, to be 
triggered by a decision of competent authorities (BCBS, 2011c). 
The Basel Committee strived hard to harmonise regulatory 
deductions, which turned out to be an important source of cross-country 
inconsistencies.23 However, national interests are prevailing once again, 
                                                     
23 Under Basel III, prudential filters will be applied mostly to common equity 
(under Basel II, a significant amount of regulatory adjustments referred to Tier 2 
capital). Compulsory deductions include goodwill and all other intangibles, even 
though some room for national discretion remains (banks reporting under local 
GAAP may use the IFRS definition of intangible assets to determine which assets 
must be deducted, subject to supervisory approval). Deferred tax assets imputed to 
future profits must also be deducted, as well as all investments in own common 
shares and other components of regulatory capital (to avoid double counting of 
capital), and mutual cross-holdings of capital that may artificially inflate capital. 
Defined benefit pension fund assets should be deducted from CET1 (while 
liabilities cannot be counted in CET1) since they may not be used to protect 
depositors and creditors. Investments in the capital of financial institutions outside 
the scope of regulatory consolidation where the bank does not own more that 10% 
of their common share can be recognised up to 10% of the bank’s CET1; for entities 
where the bank owns more than 10% of common shares, all capital instruments 
other than common shares must be fully deducted. Net losses due to changes in 
the fair value of liabilities related to own credit risk must be fully deducted from 
CET1, as well as any shortfall in provisions for expected losses. Minority 
participations issued by fully consolidated subsidiaries may be recognised in CET1 
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with countries pressing hard to retain tailored deductions according to the 
specific needs of their banks. A prominent example is double counting of 
capital (‘gearing’) in banking groups comprising insurance subsidiaries.  
The Committee also decided to set an ‘absolute’ back-stop to Tier 1 
capital, which as a ratio to total (unweighted) assets24 will not be allowed to 
fall below 3%; this requirement will formally become part of the new Pillar 
1 capital requirements in 2018, after a monitoring period. Once in force, the 
‘absolute’ capitaI requirement will cap maximum leverage in the banking 
system and, in the words of the Basel Committee, “introduce additional 
safeguards against model risk and measurement errors by supplementing 
the risk-based measure with a simple, transparent, independent measure of 
risk” (BCBS, 2011a, p. 4). The leverage ratio will be calculated in a 
comparable manner across jurisdictions, which brings back to the fore the 
objective of competitive equality, substantially lost with Basel II. 
Unfortunately, the new rule seems weak, as it allows the aggregate 
leverage of regulated banks to rise to as much as 33: a level close to the 
aggregate leverage at end-2007, when the crisis struck. Moreover, many 
years will pass before this ceiling will become binding. A similar device 
was already present in the US Prompt Corrective Action rules, which 
require a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio higher than 4% to classify banks as 
‘adequately capitalised’. 
Moreover, in order to tackle imprudent maturity transformation and 
illiquidity, the Basel Committee has introduced two new liquidity ratios: 
one for the short term, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), requiring banks 
to have sufficient funds to meet severe liquidity stress over 30 days; the 
other one for the long term, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), requiring 
banks to dispose of a minimum of stable funding over a 1-year time 
horizon.25 Many details regarding the two ratios are yet to be defined – 
                                                                                                                                       
(or Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2) only if the instruments meet all eligibility criteria 
if issued by the bank, and the issuing subsidiary is itself a bank. 
24 The measure of exposure also takes into account off-balance sheet items, deemed 
to be source of potentially significant leverage. 
25 The LCR is defined as “stock of high-quality liquid assets/total net cash outflows 
over the next 30 calendar days”, which must be equal or higher than 100%. Stress 
scenarios include a significant downgrade of the institution’s public credit rating; a 
partial loss of deposits; a loss of unsecured wholesale funding; a significant 
increase in secured funding haircuts; increases in derivative collateral calls and 
substantial calls on contractual and non-contractual off-balance sheet exposures, 
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notably including the definition of liquid assets, given that the sovereign 
debt crisis has raised questions on the possibility of treating government 
securities as safe assets under all circumstances. In order to mitigate the 
potentially negative effects of the new capital and liquidity requirements 
on the supply of credit, fairly long transition periods have been envisaged 
(Table 4). 
Table 4. Basel III phase-in arrangements 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 As of 
1 Jan 2019 
Leverage ratio Supervisory monitoring 
Parallel run 1 Jan 2013 – 1 Jan 2017 
Disclosure starts 1 Jan 2015  
Migration 
to Pillar 1  
Minimum common equity capital 
ratio (%) 
  3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Capital conservation buffer (%)      0.625 1.25 1.875 2.50 
Minimum common equity plus 
capital conservation buffer (%) 
  3.5 4.0 4.5 5.125 5.75 6.375 7.0 
Phase-in of deductions from CET1 
(including amounts exceeding the 
limit for DTAs, MSRs and 
financials) (%) 
   20 40 60 80 100 100 
Minimum Tier 1 capital (%)   4.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
Minimum total capital (%)   8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Minimum total capital plus 
conservation buffer (%) 
  8.0 8.0 8.0 8.625 9.25 9.875 10.5 
Capital instruments that no longer 
qualify as non-core Tier 1 capital or 
Tier 2 capital 
  Phased out over 10 year horizon beginning 2013 
 
Liquidity coverage ratio Observation period begins    
Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
    
Net stable funding ratio Observation period begins       
Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
 
Notes: Shading indicates transition periods. All dates are as of 1 January. 
Source: BCBS (2011a). 
 
                                                                                                                                       
including committed credit and liquidity facilities. The NSFR is defined as the ratio 
between the available amount of stable funding and the required amount of stable 
funding (as determined by supervisors), which must be higher than 100%. Stable 
funding includes equity and liabilities expected to be reliable sources of funds over 
a one-year time horizon under conditions of extended stress (BCBS, 2010b). 
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Further capital surcharges have been introduced for market and 
counterparty risk – including incentives for banks to use central 
counterparties for OTC derivatives, higher capital requirements for trading 
and derivative activities, securitisations and off-balance sheet exposures.26  
Pillar 2 requirements have also been strengthened (after the 
amendments already adopted in July 2009) with new requirements on 
corporate governance, risk aggregation and stress testing; and there has 
been a significant strengthening of disclosure requirements under Pillar 3, 
which include a detailed description of capital instruments, the 
components of regulatory capital and their calculation, and separate 
disclosure of all regulatory adjustments and items not deducted from CET 
1. 
Overall, the Basel III rules involve a significant improvement in the 
quality and quantity of capital requirements and contain important new 
provisions for counterparty risk and market infrastructure.  
The BCBS Quantitative Impact Study (BCBS, 2010c) has estimated 
that the increase in capital required for a sample of 94 large, diversified and 
internationally active banking groups, will be about €165 billion for the 
CET1 minimum requirement of 4.5%, and €577 billion for a CET1 target 
level of 7.0%. The changes in the definition of capital entail a reduction in 
current CET1 capital held for regulatory purposes by some 40%; actual Tier 
1 capital ratios would on average decline from 10.5 to 6.3% of RWA, and 
total capital ratios would decline from 14.0 to 8.4%. Risk-weighted assets 
                                                     
26 Banks are required to determine their regulatory capital for counterparty credit 
risk using stressed inputs, to prevent capital charges from being too low in good 
times and address pro-cyclicality. They will also be subject to a capital charge for 
potential mark-to-market losses (Credit Valuation Adjustment, CVA) related to 
deteriorating credit worthiness of a counterparty, and to strengthened standards 
for collateral management and initial margining. Basel III also supports the 
establishment of standards for financial markets infrastructures (e.g. central 
counterparties, CCPs; low risk weights for exposures to central counterparties and 
higher capital requirements for bilateral OTC exposures should create incentives 
for banks to migrate to CCPs); raises risk weights on exposures within the financial 
sector, to contain systemic risk; and encourages banks to reduce reliance on 
external ratings, e.g. through the requirement to develop internal evaluation of 
externally rated securitisation exposures, as a part of the ongoing review of the 
securitisation framework. 
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are projected to increase by 23%, largely driven by higher requirements for 
market and counterparty risk.27  
And yet, Basel III has not tackled the fundamental flaws in the capital 
framework, while support among bankers is being undermined by 
increasing awareness of the competitive distortions created by the RWA 
calculations under national supervisory implementation. 
The fundamental drawbacks of the IRB approach have not been 
corrected. The system still looks at the riskiness of single assets or classes of 
assets. Logical and technical flaws stemming from the non-stationarity of 
time series used for internal estimates and their weak predictive power 
when confronted with shifts in market sentiment, are still there, as are the 
flawed assumptions on risk distribution, portfolio invariance and the 
exogenous nature of systemic risk. The weighting of market risk has been 
increased but still cannot account – almost by definition – for systemic risk: 
what matters for this type of risk is the correlation of individual portfolios 
with market developments when market sentiment shifts adversely and 
confidence is shaken.28 The systemic stability problems posed by low 
unweighted capital ratios has not been recognised, let alone coped with. 
Strengthening capital requirements for counterparty risk and 
interconnections will not resolve this problem. And risk weights for the 
largest banks remain the output of highly heterogeneous internal models 
                                                     
27 The Quantitative Impact Study also calculated that the impact of the Basel III 
package on a sample of 169 smaller banks will be less pronounced, with a CET1 
shortfall of €8 bn to reach the CET1 minimum of 4.5%, and €25 billion to reach the 
7% target level. The changes in the definition of capital are expected to produce a 
decline of 24.7% in CET1 capital, Tier 1 capital ratios would decline from 9.8% to 
8.1% and total capital ratios would decline from 12.8% to 10.3%. RWA would 
increase on average only by 4% (reflecting the lower exposure of smaller banks to 
market and counterparty risks). 
28 For market risk, the 1996 system was modified with the so-called Basel 2.5 
framework, adopted in July 2009 (BCBS, 2009b) and transposed into the EU 
legislation by the CRD III, leading to a significant increase in the capital charge for 
market risks. Its aims included clarifying the exposures to be included in trading 
books, providing guidance for their prudent valuation, strengthening modelling 
standards, and covering types of market risk previously neglected. A ‘stressed-
VaR’ measure was added, based on a 10-day, 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence 
interval VaR measure of the portfolio, with model inputs calibrated to historical 
data from a continuous 12-month period of significant financial stress (the period 
used must be approved and regularly reviewed by supervisors). 
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leading to an unacceptable variety in the RWA ratios to total assets – 
resulting in vast differences in capital requirements that undermine the 
international legitimacy of the entire prudential framework.  
Other weaknesses include the zero risk-weighting of sovereign debt, 
which, incidentally, seems inconsistent with the EBA’s stress test 
methodology and the bias towards real estate, which continues to benefit 
from favourable risk-weighted treatment. 
Another pitfall of the Basel framework, which has not been 
eliminated under Basel III, are the perverse incentives to delay loss 
recognition and the replacement of lost capital. This requires a change in 
the incentives confronting bank managers as well as supervisors. In this 
regard, Pillar 2 was, and still is, inadequately designed, first and foremost 
because it does not provide a simple, robust and timely measure of banks’ 
strength. 
Most important of all, the Basel Committee has failed to address the 
main defect of the system, which is faulty goal specification. This cannot be 
resolved without rethinking the whole approach to bank capital regulation. 
Otherwise, the same failures that beset Basel I and Basel II are bound to 
reappear and the risk of systemic instability will stay high.  
Rather than tackle its deep-rooted problems, Basel III has proceeded 
by adding ‘patches’ to the pre-existing system, trying to fix the visible 
shortcomings of the system. It is akin to a doctor treating the symptoms of 
an illness but steering well clear of the disease underlying them. The result 
has been to further complicate a system that was already overly complex, 
without any serious analysis of the costs and incentive effects of the new 
patchwork of capital and liquidity requirements.29  
And, as long as the RWA approach is not abandoned, there will be no 
certainty that the new capital and liquidity requirements will prevent a 
repetition of acute financial instability. Suffice it to recall, in this regard, 
that a total solvency ratio of 12% under the Basel rules may only entail an 
                                                     
29 A notable example of this ‘patchwork’ approach is the proposed capital 
surcharge on SIFIs, which was developed within the Financial Stability Board, and 
is based on the assumption that it is possible to calculate the systemic risk of 
individual financial institutions and make them internalise such risk by means of 
capital surcharges or other constraints on their operations. The logic of this 
surcharge is unclear; but what is clear is that, being based as it is on the RWA 
approach, it is open to manipulation and circumvention. 
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absolute capital ratio of 3%, if the RWA to total asset ratio is 25%, 
corresponding to a leverage of 33. Furthermore, the new system’s multiple 
layers of capital compound the uncertainty on the resulting capital 
requirements.   
The European Commission has reacted, in its CRD IV proposal 
(European Commission 2011b), by trying to impose a ceiling on the 
minimum capital ratio. They argue that this is necessary to achieve a truly 
single rule book and that uncoordinated stricter requirements in individual 
member states would induce banks to shift activities to another member 
state or shadow banking. At the same time, they have dropped from their 
proposal the requirement of a back-stop ‘absolute’ minimum capital 
requirement (the main differences between Basel III and CRD IV are 
summarised in Box 1).30  
 
Box 1. Basel III versus CRD IV 
The CRD IV proposal largely incorporates the Basel III provisions but in a 
number of respects it departs from them. On balance, the overall effect of 
these departures from Basel III is to weaken the banking rules. 
Starting from weaker provisions, first, the definition of Common 
Equity Tier 1 (CET1) is softened by CRD IV by referring to ‘capital 
instruments’ rather than ‘shares’, based on the consideration that the 
definition of ‘ordinary share’ varies according to national company law. To 
counter the risk of excessive differentiations, there is a further provision 
mandating full transparency of instruments accepted by national 
supervisors, and the EBA will be required to compile, maintain and publish 
a list of these instruments. The CRD IV also makes eligible for inclusion in 
CET1 the ‘funds for general banking risk’ (Art. 24 of proposed Regulation, 
European Commission, 2011b), while in Basel III CET1, only common shares 
and retained earnings may be included. Moreover, under CRD IV, ineligible 
CET1 instruments are subject to a grandfathering of 10 years, starting in 
2013, while under Basel III ineligible instruments must be removed from 
CET1 in 2013. 
                                                     
30 The ratio will not be binding but will only act as an instrument of supervisory 
review under Pillar 2. Under Basel III it was meant to migrate to Pillar 1 in 2018. 
Article 482 of the proposed Regulation (European Commission, 2011b) envisages 
that a possible conversion of the leverage ratio into a binding measure could be 
possible after 2018, based on a new Commission proposal.   
TIME TO SET BANKING REGULATION RIGHT | 55 
Second, in addition to de facto removing the back stop leverage ratio, 
as was mentioned, CRD IV leaves banks free to choose how to disclose their 
Tier 1 ‘absolute’ leverage, which they can report gross or net of exemptions 
and ‘national discretions’ permitted by the Regulation. Also, during the 
‘parallel run’ period, under CRD IV, regulators may permit banks to report 
end-of-the-quarter leverage ratios while the Basel III leverage ratio is 
calculated on the basis of monthly averages over a quarter. 
Third, Basel III is also stricter with rules on regulatory deductions 
from capital: for example, it requires banks to deduct investment in 
insurance subsidiaries, while the CRD IV permits the application of 
accounting consolidation as an alternative to deduction, subject to regulatory 
approval (Art. 46). Under Basel III, unrealised gains and losses will be 
adjusted in CET1 from 2013, while the CRD IV leaves national regulators the 
flexibility to set a 5-year grandfathering from 2013. The deductions with 
regard to deferred tax assets and holdings in financial institutions above the 
10% limit will begin in 2014 under Basel III, with a phase-in period until 
2018, while CRD IV requires such deductions only starting from 2017. Basel 
III is also stricter on the eligibility of minority-interest capital (allowing only 
full consolidation), while the CRD IV indirectly removes the restrictions on 
minority-interest (through the allowance of ‘proportional consolidation’ 
method). 
On the other hand, CRD IV leaves open the possibility for national 
regulators to anticipate (by two years) the full application of the new CET1 
ratio and certain deductions (by one year), and has stricter rules on 
securitisation documentation. It also envisages a minimum threshold for the 
conversion or write-down of additional Tier 1 instruments when the 
CET1/RWA ratio falls under 5.125%.  
In order to limit the total effects of these departures from Basel III, 
CRD IV introduces a floor on total prudential capital, calculated on the basis 
of Basel I rules, which cannot fall below 6.4%.  
 
These departures from the Basel Accord unfortunately seem to reflect 
more the desire to protect undercapitalised universal banks at the core of 
the Union’s financial system than to establish a more level playing field. In 
any event, maximum harmonisation of minimum capital ratios is at odd 
with the traditional internal market philosophy of providing a minimum 
platform of protection but letting the member states adopt more 
demanding standards when they so wish, provided access remains open to 
all competitors under the minimal protection. More importantly, pressures 
for higher capital requirements in global financial markets are more the 
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expression of investors’ demands than the whims of national regulators. By 
trying to force on all banks the low capital of some continental banks, the 
Commission is opening another fault line in the prudential system.31   
Other contentious provisions in the CRD IV proposal include the fact 
that ratings continue to play a central role in the determination of risk-
weights, despite the stated intention by the Commission to reduce over-
reliance on external ratings, as reflected elsewhere in their amendments to 
the Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (in November 2011); and the 
expanded room for national supervisory discretion in the determination of 
capital requirements of individual institutions32 and risk weights on 
exposures backed by mortgages, which is in sharp contrast with the 
maximum harmonisation approach (see Lannoo, 2012). 
 
                                                     
31 The Vickers Report (ICB, 2011) is adamant that this provision makes no sense; 
see. pp. 96-97.   
32 This includes the capital requirements for anti-cyclical purposes and additional 
capital requirements “where justified by specific circumstances under the so-called 
Pillar 2” (European Commission 2011b, Introduction). 
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6. RESTORING SOUND PRUDENTIAL 
REGULATION 
he goals of a sound system of prudential regulation are already 
implicit in the preceding analysis; it is time to make them explicit. 
Our proposals apply to all banks, including large international 
banking groups; we see no need for special treatment of large banks, 
provided capital rules are applied on a fully consolidated basis. There is 
also no need for specific liquidity or funding ratios: liquidity and maturity 
transformation should be a central part of the supervisory review of banks 
and banking groups under Pillar 2. Finally, while each of these measures 
has merits in combating moral hazard, there is no need to forbid specific 
operations by banking groups (e.g. the Volcker rule) or ring fence certain 
activities (as under the Vickers Report proposals); instead, the antidote to 
excessive risk-taking should come from the elimination of banking charter 
subsidies, thus taming moral hazard at its root, and strengthened 
incentives to preserve capital for shareholders and management. Under our 
approach, the size and risks of banking are likely to recede substantially, 
with limited real economic costs.  
There are essentially three main weaknesses in the current approach: 
• capital ratios based on RWA and calculated on the basis on banks’ 
internal models, which should be scrapped and replaced by strong, 
clear and simple capital rules; 
• supervisory forbearance, the elimination of which requires an overhaul 
of Pillar 2, basically through the adoption of a PCA regime à la FDIC; 
and 
• weak market discipline, which can be remedied by capital metrics that 
are easy to read and understand for all market participants, 
supplemented by banks issuing junior debentures that are convertible 
into equity.  
T
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In trying to correct for these weaknesses, it would be important to limit the 
costs and distortions associated with regulation, basically by setting simple 
and clear rules and avoiding the multiplication of instruments. We will 
examine each of these three prescriptive proposals in more detail below, 
while always keeping the fourth one in mind.  
6.1 Capital requirements: what for and how much? 
The first question to address is what task bank capital should usefully 
perform. Until the recent crisis, the main goal of capital rules in the Basel 
Accords had been solely the micro-prudential stability of individual banks. 
Experience has shown that micro-prudential stability does not ensure 
macro-financial stability (fallacy of composition). The regulatory response 
has been to set up machinery for macro-prudential regulation that in the 
main boils down to monetary authorities paying more attention to credit 
and asset market dynamics, and the excessive accumulation of debt by the 
public and private sector alike, rather than price stability alone. However, 
this is not sufficient to eradicate from the system excessive risk-taking by 
bankers free-riding on the implicit subsidies of the banking charter, nor 
does it provide a reasonable assurance that free-riding doesn’t become so 
widespread as to endanger systemic stability.  
In the simplest possible version of prudential rules, bank capital can 
effectively serve two purposes: i) to provide a simple and readable 
indicator of banks’ strength to the markets and supervisors, fostering 
market discipline and triggering supervisory action and ii) to preserve 
systemic stability by containing aggregate leverage, hence the deleveraging 
credit multiplier. 
As to the first, risk-weighted capital ratios are unable to sort out weak 
banks and therefore they make the market discipline pillar of Basel rules 
largely ineffective, while leaving supervisors open to political pressure to 
rescue their banks out of public sight. The ready solution is to scrap risk-
weighting, which has no informational value, and switch to an ‘absolute’ 
capital ratio: the relevant measure of banks’ capital strength should be the 
ratio between common equity Tier 1 capital, in the new simple definition 
already agreed under Basel III, and total assets. Goodwill and future tax 
credits, and similar items, should be deducted from capital unless they 
correspond to certain and readily usable reserves in case of need. 
One question to be addressed here concerns reliance of the capital 
indicator on book-value measures of equity, which may weaken its 
signalling value since book values are lagging indicators – mainly owing to 
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the fact that losses are recorded with significant delays. A better alternative 
would be to use the market value of equity.  Calomiris & Herring (2011) 
and Haldane (2011) have shown that market-based capital indicators may 
provide a reliable and, more important, forward-looking indicator of a 
bank’s capital position.  
Calomiris & Herring (2011) use a 90-day moving average of the ratio 
of the market value of equity over the sum of the market value of equity 
plus the face value of debt, which they call the Quasi-Market-Value-of-
Equity Ratio (QMVER).33 Their QMVER displays excellent signalling 
properties, unaffected by extreme market conditions: with data for 2006-10, 
it sorts out reliably the banks that fell during the storm (with QMVER 
below a 4% threshold) and those that stood up on their own (displaying 
QMVER above 4%). For banks that failed or had to be bailed out, the ratio 
fell below the critical threshold well in advance of insolvency. Haldane 
(2011) shows three different market-based indicators that perform equally 
well for a sample of 33 large banking groups: market-value capitalisation to 
i) book value of total assets, ii) book value of debt and iii) book value of 
equity (this last ratio being Tobin’s ‘q’). All three prove able to discriminate 
successfully between ‘crisis’ and ‘no-crisis’ banks, and signal impending 
distress well in advance. An alternative market-based indicator that has 
been proposed is the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads: however, they 
are unlikely to be robust, because CDS markets are thin and subject to 
manipulation, and the pricing of risk is not a stationary variable.  
Thus, our first conclusion is that the market value of common equity 
can provide a reliable indicator of strength or weakness, and therefore may 
be used by supervisors as a reference in sorting out weak banks to be 
placed under enhanced supervision. It may also provide a useful reference 
for strengthened market discipline under Pillar 3.  
                                                     
33 The indicator is built to smooth fluctuations in share prices and dampen the 
noise in market signals. QMVER has the desirable properties of accuracy (using a 
90-day moving average allows one to identify sufficiently persistent and severe 
weaknesses), comprehensiveness (market capitalisation is a measure of a bank’s 
overall value), timeliness (market values of shares are continuously observable), 
predictability (markets should generally be able to forecast variance and potential 
movements in the neighbourhood of the trigger). Regarding timeliness, there is a 
trade-off between the ability of the indicator to rapidly signal distress and the need 
to smooth short-term volatility: the authors argue that 90-days averaging provides 
an effective solution, also in order to give the bank sufficient time to recapitalise. 
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A problem that may arise in this connection – on which we do not 
dwell too much here – is how to make sure that the indicator is not 
manipulated by banks undertaking covert support operations on behalf of 
their own shares. Suffice it to say that solutions are available, ranging from 
specific transparency obligations to special restrictions on purchases of own 
stock in certain circumstances. 
We must now decide how much capital. Following Hellwig (2010), 
we maintain that this question can be answered properly only in a systemic 
stability perspective. Capital performs the fundamental function of capping 
risk-taking for individual banks as well as for the banking system as a 
whole: thus, it strengthens confidence and reduces the risk of bank runs 
(complemented, in this task, by retail deposit insurance); and it lowers the 
credit deleveraging multiplier, and hence the eventual real economic cost of 
a bank crisis, should one nonetheless happen. 
A main conclusion from the preceding analysis is that capital 
requirements should be based on a criterion of prudence. This is an obvious 
consequence of the high real economic costs of banking crises, and the fact 
that they are typically driven by sudden shifts of expectations that become 
self-fulfilling. This last feature makes any precise calculation of capital 
requirements impossible: by necessity then, one must err on the side of 
caution. An upper limit to leverage between 10 and 14 times capital – 
corresponding to an absolute capital ratio in the range of 7 to 10% – may be 
adequate. Two pieces of evidence point to the need of such an increase in 
capital requirements. The first one is empirical studies of the net marginal 
social benefit of raising capital ratios (Miles et al., 2011); the second, is the 
observed explosion in the size of banking in the 2000s, making banks too 
large to fail, with unclear benefits in the quality and efficiency of banking 
services to the economy (e.g. Turner, 2010; Philippon, 2011). Similar 
conclusions are arrived at by Admati et al. (2011) and the Vickers Report 
(ICB, 2011).  
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that some large international 
banks (e.g. Bank of America and Citigroup) have already moved to a 
common equity capital ratio around 9%. But of course, for most banks there 
would be a substantial increase in capital requirements: large international 
banks typically hold (common equity) capital equivalent to between 3% 
and 8% of total assets. 
The capital requirement above should be the upper bound of a 
ladder, above which the capital position would be seen as ‘comfortable’ by 
supervisors, below which supervisors would require banks to undertake 
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corrective action and, at some point, oust management and intervene and 
take control of the bank. Thus, capital would be available to meet emerging 
losses, albeit falling capital ratios would produce consequences for the 
bank. It should also be mentioned that the steps in the ladder defining 
supervisory responses should refer to the book value of capital. To these 
issues we will come back shortly.  
A desirable feature of prudential rules in a globalised world is that 
the definition of capital should leave little room for national discretion to 
favour ‘own’ banks, pointing to the need to harmonise the definition of 
capital cross-country. Scrapping internal models and RWA, and moving to 
unweighted capital ratios, would offer clear advantages in this regard. 
Once regulatory capital is simply and consistently defined, the room for 
manipulation would be much reduced. Other factors, e.g. accounting 
differences on derivatives netting, might still complicate the uniform 
application of capital rules, but the issue would then become more visible 
and easier to handle.  
Two objections to this approach that require an answer concern i) the 
incentive effects of an absolute capital requirement and ii) the costs to the 
banking system and the economy.  
The first objection basically is that an unweighted capital ratio doesn’t 
properly price risk, leading bank managers always to skew their portfolios 
in favour of riskier assets in order to maximise returns (like Tobin’s 
‘plungers’). However, as we have argued, bankers will only behave as 
plungers when they are not liable for the costs of their mistakes. Once any 
explicit or implicit promise of a bail-out is removed from the system, there 
is a legitimate expectation that they would carefully ponder the risk profile 
of their portfolios. A further tool to prevent excessive risk-taking by 
making bankers pay the full price of their risks is deposit insurance, by 
means of risk-based fees paid ex-ante.34 We do not dwell here on this issue, 
which we have discussed elsewhere (Carmassi et al., 2010).  
                                                     
34 The reference here is to the FDIC system, where supervisors assess the overall 
riskiness of banks based on a number of factors not limited to capital, but including 
liquidity, interconnectedness, complexity, quality of management and other 
factors. In order to avoid moral hazard, deposit insurance should be strictly limited 
to retail deposits and exclude other deposits as well as other classes of creditors; 
and under no circumstances should its accumulated fund be used to rescue the 
bank as a whole. 
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The second objection is that raising substantially capital requirements 
will entail high costs for banks and the economy. This view points to the 
empirical observation that the cost of equity in capital markets seems to 
exceed significantly the cost of debt, and that the proposition of invariance 
of the cost of capital to the composition of funding, as in Modigliani & 
Miller (1958), isn’t valid due to the favourable tax treatment of debt, 
asymmetric information and transaction costs (Berger et al., 1995). A recent 
IMF study by Keen & De Mooij (2012) finds a significant positive effect of 
tax deductions on leverage. 
However, the ‘equity is expensive’ hypothesis is controversial. 
Admati et al. (2011) claim that the main reason why equity is more 
expensive than debt is the presence of distortions created by public 
subsidies implicit in the banking charter. Roger & Vitek (2012) have 
estimated the macroeconomic costs of a synchronised global increase in 
bank capital adequacy requirements under Basel III with a multi-country 
model, and have found fairly modest effects, especially if monetary policy 
is eased in response to widening bank interest rate spreads. The opposite 
conclusion, not surprisingly, was reached by the Institute of International 
Finance, a well funded and vocal bank lobbying organisation in 
Washington: according to their study (IIF, 2011) Basel III rules, which are 
much weaker than ours, would reduce GDP by 3.2% by 2015.   
In any event, the total cost of capital to a bank must in the end reflect 
risk-adjusted returns on total assets (ICB, 2011) and the risk of bankruptcy 
(Berger et al., 1995; Kaufman, 1992); the first component is in all likelihood 
independent of the composition of the funding, and the second decreases 
with increasing equity funding. Moreover, in assessing the impact of higher 
capital requirements, one needs to look at the full costs and benefits, also 
including the reduced risks of systemic crises. Miles et al. (2011), for 
instance, claim that on the one hand the impact on GDP is at least 
uncertain, because it is very difficult to determine the distribution of 
potential shocks to banks’ asset values and GDP growth; and that, on the 
other hand, the benefits of significantly higher capital requirements are 
substantial in terms of increased financial stability.  
6.2 Combating supervisory forbearance 
Supervisory forbearance clearly emerged as a main problem in the run-up 
to the recent financial crisis, but it has been completely overlooked in the 
rectification of banking prudential rules. This is not surprising, given that 
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the task of correcting past mistakes was assigned to those responsible for 
making them: the supervisors and central bankers in the BCBS.  
Many large international banks were allowed to operate on a very 
thin layer of capital and to display at the same time a comfortable capital 
position. Suffice it to mention that a few months before their collapse, the 
risk-weighted capital ratio of Lehman was 16.1%  (end of May 2008), while 
Dexia displayed a risk-weighted capital ratio of 14.7% (year-end 2010). In a 
number of cases of failing banks, after the collapse, it has become obvious 
that supervisors looked complacently at excessive leverage by these 
institutions while they engaged in imprudent acquisitions, and gladly 
collaborated in postponing loss recognition or making them up opaquely 
with disguised public rescues (e.g. in Belgian, French and German 
recapitalisation operations).   
In the same way as the decision to go to war is too delicate to be left 
in the hands of generals, the design of bank supervision is too important for 
systemic stability to be left solely in the hands of banking supervisors. As 
long as supervision of large cross-border banking groups is organised on a 
national basis, while competition is global, and capital metrics do not 
provide clear signals on banks’ strength, the risk that supervisors will 
continue to collude with their banks remains very high.  
The adoption of indicators of capital strength based on the market 
value of equity resolves the problem of providing supervisors and the 
public with the information needed to act. The complementary step is to 
oblige supervisors to act when the capital indicators show that a bank is 
seriously weakening, by placing the bank under enhanced supervisory 
review and linking corrective action of increasing intensity to a ladder of 
capital thresholds. The US prompt corrective action provides a useful 
model for the design of such a system of mandated supervisory 
intervention. 
Accordingly, a number of ‘capital strength zones’ should be 
identified, as for instance in the PCA zones of well capitalised, adequately 
capitalised, undercapitalised, significantly undercapitalised and critically 
undercapitalised banks. When a bank enters the undercapitalisation area, 
supervisors would be required to intervene, with increasing intrusiveness 
as the bank falls in the lower zones – e.g. from the request to recapitalise, to 
the suspension of bonuses for management and dividends, down to the 
obligatory disposal of assets or business lines, the ousting of management, 
and eventually the bank’s resolution. 
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As in the PCA model, falling below the capital thresholds would 
invoke an obligation to act but by no means would it automatically trigger 
specific actions. For each capital zone, a menu of instruments would be 
available to supervisors, some of which would always be required (e.g. a 
capital restoration plan or the suspension of dividends), while others 
would be left to the discretion of supervisors (e.g. the restriction of certain 
activities or of interest paid on deposits). But supervisors should in all cases 
be required to explain publicly what they have done and not done, with 
adequate motivation. When capital falls below a minimum, say 2% of total 
assets, the banks should be resolved by the supervisors under an 
administrative resolution procedure. A credible and effective resolution 
regime is the essential ingredient to remove from the system any implicit 
promise of a bail-out. Again we don’t need to dwell much longer on this, 
since we have dealt with the issue extensively elsewhere (Carmassi et al., 
2010; see also BCBS, 2010d). 
Transparency with the new capital indicators and the presumption to 
act under a system of pre-announced capital zones would protect 
supervisors from lobbying and regulatory capture by banks and reduce the 
temptation for supervisors to connive with regulated entities. This would 
also help significantly to minimise eventual losses of bank insolvency.   
6.3 Market discipline with contingent capital 
The system that has been described already goes a long way towards 
reducing the risk of systemic instability, by strengthening bank capital and 
supervisors’ responsibility and independence. And transparency and 
disclosure obligations have already been strengthened by the Basel III 
Accord, and would be made effective by a readable capital indicator.  
A final component is needed, however, to create stronger incentives 
for management and shareholders to avoid excessive risk-taking and free-
riding on the system’s safeguards. This is the obligation for banks to issue 
substantial amounts of junior debt convertible into equity, with conversion 
based on the market value capital indicator used for supervisory purposes. 
In this regard, many authors, including ICB (2011), stress the perverse 
incentives preventing shareholders from raising new equity for fear of 
dilution and adverse reactions by investors.  
Contingent capital (CoCo) is debt that automatically converts into 
capital when certain pre-determined events occur or specified triggers are 
hit. In this way, it produces an increase of bank capital in adverse states of 
the world: directly, through contractual convertibility, and indirectly, 
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through incentives to voluntarily raise new equity capital. If properly 
designed, CoCos offer a number of advantages including the tax shield 
related to interest deductibility (unlike equity) and their appeal to 
institutional investors, to the extent that the incentive to avoid conversion 
implies that they are likely to trade more like fixed-income instruments. 
Market discipline would be strengthened if there were a significant take-up 
of these instruments by institutional investors. 
A number of proposals have been tabled in this regard, e.g. Calomiris 
& Herring (2011); Coffee (2011); D’Souza et al. (2009); Flannery (2010). 
Moreover, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has made room for 
the inclusion of contingent capital instruments in eligible capital, provided 
certain conditions are respected (BCBS, 2011c). After the 2008-09 financial 
crisis, some banks have spontaneously issued contingent capital 
instruments: Lloyds in 2009, Rabobank in 2010 and Credit Suisse in 2011.  
The rationale of these proposals and, accordingly, the capital 
instruments that have been proposed vary a great deal, but they all share 
the common objective of strengthening market discipline on bank 
managers and shareholders and complementing the role of supervisors 
(Coffee, 2011).  
Contingent capital may serve three alternative goals, namely: i) 
providing a cushion of common equity (‘bail-in’ objective, for orderly 
liquidation); ii) providing a signal of default risk, i.e. in the form of the 
observed yield spread on convertible debt prior to any conversion 
(‘signalling’ objective); and iii) encouraging voluntary, pre-emptive and 
timely issuance of new equity (‘equity-issuance’ objective). It seems to us 
that the latter goal should be privileged since it is the one that minimises 
the need for supervisory intervention and forced recapitalisation of the 
banks. While the bail-in approach would create an additional capital buffer 
to cover realised losses ex-post, but leave incentives unaffected, we do not 
need an extra signal of default risk beyond that provided by market-value 
capital indicators. Indeed, such a signal may prove redundant or even 
contradictory. Reference to a moving average indicator of capital strength, 
as has been discussed, would have the additional merit of making it more 
difficult for speculators to force the conversion of CoCos through a 
coordinated run on a stock. 
To make sure that CoCos can effectively perform their function, the 
threat of conversion must be credible and effective in encouraging prompt 
recapitalisation (Calomiris & Herring, 2011). To this end, the amount of 
issuance should be large, e.g. 100% of capital or 10% of total assets; and the 
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conversion rate should be sufficiently penalising for shareholders. The 
combination of the size of issuance and the conversion rate can produce 
stronger dilutive effects on shareholders than a pre-emptive equity 
issuance, so that they would have a strong incentive to recapitalise before 
the trigger for converting CoCos is hit. Finally, as has been mentioned, the 
trigger for conversion should be the market indicator of capital strength 
used by supervisors to sort out weak banks, so as to ensure consistency 
with prudential rules.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS  
he Basel prudential framework played an important role in 
generating the financial crisis of 2008-09 and aggravating its 
consequences. The main indictment is that it permitted leverage 
ratios of 40, and even 50. In part this was due to gaps in the application of 
banking rules, in part to risk mitigation techniques that made it possible for 
banks to reduce massively the need for regulatory capital. Aided by the 
stunning opacity of solvency ratios, which made weak banks look even 
better than strong banks, supervisors closed both eyes to excessive risk-
taking by their regulated entities and sided with them in the drive for 
international expansion. The increasing variance of actual capital ratios 
indicates a dramatic distortion of the international playing field, as more 
and more competitive conditions in banking markets have come to depend 
on discretion in the application of the rules by national regulators. At the 
same time, market discipline was made futile by the opacity of capital 
indicators.  
The new Basel III Accord has strengthened the definition of capital 
and has raised capital requirements, but has not resolved the fundamental 
problems posed by RWA calculations based on internal models, whereby 
basically large banks have ample scope to decide their capital 
requirements. It has left ample discretion to national supervisors in the 
determination of capital coefficients for anti-cyclical purposes and 
surcharges for SIFIs. It has not addressed the perverse incentives 
confronting supervisors, which remain exposed to capture by their 
regulated entities due to the opacity of the system. For the same reason, 
market discipline is unlikely to act as an effective complement to Pillars 1 
(solvency rules) and 2 (supervisory review). 
In order to overcome these shortcomings, we have proposed three 
remedies: 
T
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i) To scrap internal models and RWA, in Pillar 1, and set capital 
requirements on the basis of a straight ratio between common equity 
and total assets. The new capital ratio should be raised to between 7% 
and 10%, based on systemic stability considerations; and a new 
market-based indicator of capital strength should be published and 
used as a reference in both Pillar 2 and Pillar 3.   
ii) To use the market-based indicator, in Pillar 2, to trigger enhanced 
supervisory review; and then to bind supervisors to a set of pre-
determined corrective actions of increasing severity, triggered by 
multiple capital thresholds below the main statutory requirement. In 
order to eradicate moral hazard, the system must be ‘closed’ by a 
mandatory procedure for bank resolution when the minimum capital 
threshold is not achieved. 
iii) To complement solvency rules with the obligation, under Pillar 3, for 
banks to issue a substantial amount of debentures that convertible 
into equity. The features of these securities should be designed so as 
to create strong incentives for bank managers and shareholders to 
issue equity at an early stage, when capital weakens, in order to pre-
empt conversion. 
This set of rules should apply to all banks. There would be no need 
for special rules on liquidity or funding, which would remain open to 
supervisory review but not binding constraints. There would also be no 
need for special restrictions on banking activities and operations. 
The most remarkable feature of the policy deliberations on prudential 
rules for banking so far has been that they have been delegated to the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervisors and the banks themselves, both of 
which have a strong vested interest in preserving the pre-existing system. 
Not surprisingly, the BCBS came up with a proposal that somewhat 
‘patches up’ the Basel framework but doesn’t question its most blatant 
failures.  
It is high time that governments and parliaments take the issue in 
their own hands and decide to launch a thorough review of Basel capital 
rules that promises to be more responsive to the public interest. 
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